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About  55 percent  of total public  income  in  (exporters  or foreign  consumers).  The level of
Colombia  is earmarked for specific  areas of  duty is arbitrary  so it is questionable whether  the
government  activity.  McCleary  and Tobon  correct  amount  of export financing is provided,
recommend  reducing  the proportion  and  amount  and  the large subsidy  differences  among  sectors
of carmarked  funds to give  the govemment  distort  te  allocation  of resources.
budget  morc  flexibility.  Their  recommendations
would eliminate one quarter of existing  earmark-  The carmarking of departmental taxes on
ing and  introduce  greater  flexibility  for an  alcohol,  tobacco,  and gambling  for health,
additional  one quarter.  They  funher  conclude  welfare,  and spons  are particuiarly  strong
that:  candidates  for elimination.  Therc  is no connec-
tion between taxpayers and beneficiaries in these
Earmarking  should  be limited  to revenuc-  arrangements  and  hence  no indication  of whether
sharing and to situations wherc there is a clear  appropriate amounts of funding for these activi-
connection  between  the source  of revenue  and  ties is being  provided.
the benefits  of earmarked spending  (for example,
between  payroll  taxes  and pension/disability  lThe relativcly  new tax allowance  and sales
benefits or between  gaisoline taxes and highway  tax transfe'r  have played  important  rolcs  in the
funding).  government's  ef'l'ort to dccentralizc,  the former
for dcpartmnents,  thc latter mainly  lor inunicipali-
Even  then the commitmcnt  to carmark iig  ties. T'hcse  revenuc-sharing  arrangements  need
should  not be openi-enicd.  The autormatic  to be strengthened  by climinating  anomalies  ii
1inancinig arrangement  should  hb rcviewed  the sharing  formnulas, introducing  morc  incen-
regularly  and terminated automatically  unILss  tives  for local  rcsource  mobilization,  and
expressly renewed.  'rThis  would  force a review  of'  strengthelning  municipal  capacity  to absorb  the
pricing  arrangeme,its,  ol' the quality  of invest-  additional  resources.
ments  financed,  aLnd  of the past and  f'uture
growth  of sector  infrastructure  relative  to needs.  Earmarking  that follows thc benefit  principle
closely  (thc cot'lec  lund, the gasolinc  tax, and  the
Payroll  taxcs should cover only  social  nI  unicipal valori/ation  tax) can be continued,  but
security.  Colombia's  pay'rol: taxes adcd  24-2')  in cacti case,  modificationis are suggestcd  to
percent  to the cost of, lakbr.  Eliminating  payroll  make the arrangement  Aork hntctr.
taxes  for non-social-security  purpxses  \Aould
lower labor cosLs and prohably  take 0.5- l.()  Certain  parts  of the ncw Organic  Law of the
percentage  poirits ol'' thte employment rate.  Budget  relatcd  to carmarkinig  should be  imple-
mcnted  quickly  - the limits on minibudgets,  the
Earmarking  for PROEXPO,  which  finances  prohibition  of new earmarking from existing
subsidized  loans for exporters, should  be elimi-  public resources,  and  the claim of the central
nated.  There  is little connection  between  those  budgct on public  enterpriscs'  operating  surpluses.
who pay  import duties  and  those \kho hbnctfit
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I. INTRODUCTION
A.  Definition of Earmarking
1.  Earmarking is the term given to the practice of assigning revenues
from specific taxes or groups of taxes to certain government activities
which may be broadly or narrowly defined.  As such, it contrasts  with
general fund financing  where revenues frcm  various sources are pooled
together to be used for various government  purposes; under genera± fund
financing the connection between any particular government activity and any
specific revenue source is remote or non-existent.  In practice, earmarked
revenues may be the sole source of financing for the specified activity or
they may be supplemented  by general transfers from the government budget or
by borrowing.  Lastly, earmarking  may or may not have a benefit connection,
with the persons paying the taxes or fees overlapping substantially  with
the group receiving the benefits of the public goods or services being
provided.1
2.  Broadly defined as the setting aside of government revenues for
certain activities, earmarking can pertain to a wide range of public sector
activities.  At one end of the spectrum  would be a fairly specific set of
taxes set aside to be used for certain quite specific purposes.  Examples
would be gasoline taxes or tolls used for highway maintenance and
construction, payroll taxes used to finance pensions and medical payments,
1/ Conversely benefit taxation may or may not involve earmarking since
revenues may be added to the general pool.- 2 -
and  the  after-tax  profits  of  public  commercial  and  industrial  enterprises,
the  latter  being  included  as earmarking  to the  extent  that  profits  ere
government  purposes. Ac the  opposite  end  of  the  spectrum  would  be
earmarking  in the  broadest  sense--the  unconditional  sharing  of revenues
between  levels  of government.  Between  these  two  ends  of the  spectrum  lie  a
variety  of earmarking  varying  in  the  specifieity  of revenue  sources,  the
specificity  of government  expenditures,  the  degree  to  which  the  benefit
principle  applies,  and  the  mix  of financing  between  earmarked  and  non-
earmarked  sources.
B.  TY1es  of Earmarking  Found  in Colombia
3.  Among  free-market  LDCs,  Colombia--together  with some  other  South
American  countries--have  long  been  known  for  extensive  earmarking.  Table
1--which  cites  the  major  instances  of  earmarking  in  existence  today  with
the  agencies  involved,  the  tax  bases  and  rates,  and  the  purposes  to  which
revenues  are  put--gives  some  notion  of  the  breadth  of earmarking  as
currently  practiced. It should  be clear  from  the  outset  that  earmarking  in
Colombia  runs  the  full  spectrum  of  experience.  It  has  earmarking  which
follows  the  benefit  principle  (e.g.,  the  highway  funds,  the  airport  funds,
the  valorization  tax). It also  has  taxes  with no clear  benefit  rationale
(e.g.,  taxes  on alcohol,  gambling  and  tobacco  used  for  health,  sport6,  and
neighborhood  roads). It has  payroll  taxes  used  for  traditiona'.  social
security  purposes  (pensions  and  medical  payments)  and  also for  other
purposes-vocational  training,  family  welfare  and  nutrition. It also  has
revenue  sharing  between  levels  of government  and  an  extensive  set  of
decentralized  agencies  and  enterprises  at all  the  levels  of government.
4.  This  paper  has  two  broad  objectives.  The  first  is  the  examination
of the  trends  in the  size  and  structure  of earmarking  sincr  1970,-3-
Table  1  Waler Sources  of  Earmarkit  In  Colmba
armarkd  PuAld/
Agency  Lgal  !nstrmseot  Tax/l2venu  Sees  Tea  at  e  Purpose.
A.  Revenue  Soaring
Tax  Alseance  Law 46/1971  (  lementing  94ational  CurreAt  SevenUe  132  (1975)  Of  transfer,  702  - basis  of
(Stuado  Fiscal)  Article  IU  of  1949  Kilu  armarked &avomes  142  (1974)  popul_tion  s  1d  j02  ared  equally
Conetitution)  152  (tbereafter)  _  departents  territories
ad  tbh  Sp ecil  Distriet  of  logota.
Of  amont  received  by  each  juris-
diction,  742  ftr  Reional  Education
Fuads  (F;R)  ..n  *05  .r  Sectioal
Nesltb  Servicee  (SS).
Salee  Tax  tranfer  L_  331548  gales  tax  revestu  10t  (1949)  Mulcipal  activitils.  secondary
(Ceeoen a  las  vent..)  202  (1970)  educetioo  ed  the  'ectionol  pension
302  (1971)  fund.  The varieos a",area  allocated
to  saeb  were altoree  b)  LAw 22/1973,
ta  43/1975  -. s Deers.  132/1993.
LW  12,1196  Value  added toa  rv  ees  30.3(1994)  Por  micipal activites.  .*p.  s"all
32.0  (1997)  somnicipalities.  Amounts  also  for
34.5(1948)  uationl  territories,  sectioal socisl
37.5  (1999)  security  fund,  and  tl  Itnatituro
41.0  (1990)  beografico  Agu,tia  Codazsi  (IGlC)  sand
45.0  (1991)  Ecula  Suerlior  de  A6vinistracion
50.0  (1992)  Publie  (gI).
9.  Mat  %al Level
3.  P?OE  (Pood  d4  Dt.  444/1967  (Arttele  229)  CI?  value  c  aerchandise  1.52  Encourage  and prmote  diversification
Priton  de  iports  of  sxorts.
sortesorioe)
Dt.  2366/1974  (Article  6)  CIF  value  of  merchandise  3.72
imports  (5t  fron 1991)
LW  75/1994  Ctr  value  of  merchandise  62
imports
4.  Eixlvy  Fund  (rondo  Lw  43  (1947)  ltfinery  price  per  gallon  1142  and 53.52  Highway  inveooetnt  program  vith  102
vial  Eacional)  arnd  Decree  of  gasoline  sod  ACP  respectively  golng  to  Rational  Fund  for  Neighborhood
2962  (1968)  2oads  (Fonda  NaCiOnal  de Casinos
Yecinales  or  FnCV);  102  for  national
railways  (Forrocarriles  Nacion al
Law 30  (1982)  Rsfin  ry  price  per  gallon  Ccl.S13.S0  de  Colombia) l and 52  for  urban
of  gasoline  and  ACPR  per  gallon  transport  operatious  (Corporacion
Financiers  de  Transports  or  CFT)
5.  9UA  (Servicio  Nacional  Decree  11/1957  Payroll  of  private  12  &au.ally  Progrms  of  technical  skills  training.
Aprendisij)  (Article  9)  enterprises
Lw  53/1963  (Articles  2  Payrolls  of  public
and  5)  industrial  sod commercial  22  anally
*tterpriees  end dixe4
enterprises
Private  Enterpris*e  22  a=ually
Payrolls  of  central.  0.52  &otmally
department.  territories,
unicipalities  and Bogota
Dt  goverrAmets.
ICIU  (tnetituto  Colonbiano  LW  75/1968  (Article  63)  Sale  price  of  salt  122  Programs  of  protection  of
de  Nienetar  Fmiliar)  children  and the  foaily
LW  7/1979  (Article  39)  Payrolle  of  Public  enterprises  22  anusally
Payrolls  of  Privet.  enterprise  22  annAually
LW  89/1999  P*yrolls  of  Private  and  Public
enterpriss  32  ans  lly
eemeesation Funds  (Csjas
de Comeneecism  FPmili  n.*.  Payrolls  of  Private  sLterprises  42  Pmily  allowaces  and  *oci'
investmantel  varioue  private
ivstm  nt  t.
AM (Podo  haronmtit  al  LW  3/1977  end Isolutlon  Internatonal  Peeseagers  9$15  per  Coetruction.  Lehabilitetion
Iacimoal)  9042/1192  passenger  nd  ^larginnt  of  Airports
ta,  ,lution  1510/1995  International  Passengers  Col.$500  per
pasenger-4-
(Continued)
Table  I  Halor  8  i,rce  of  Karmarkint  in  ColombiS
Earmarked Fund/
Agency  Legal  Instruments  Ta'/.(venuo  Save  Tax  Rate  Purpes*.
9.  IFI  (Inatituto  de  Fomento  Law  6311983  and  Decree  C.I.F  value  of  Lports  0.8$  (400  of  Capitalization  of  IFI  (for
Industrial)  28/1985  21)  conversion  of  investments  and
dobt  mrvice)
10.  Caje  Agraria  Law  68/1t83  and  Decree  CAI..  F  alue  of  leporte  0.85  (400  of  Capitalisatton  of  the  fund
628/1985  2S)  secording  to  the  lws  iJ/1971
and  66/1982  and  for  the  Fund
for  Rural  dwellings  (Law  2011976
11.  Corporatioal  Hacionsl  Law 20/1979  (Article  24)  Tariff  on  .otel  lodging,  5t  Planning,  promotion  and  finauci-
de, Turieso  of  the  tourist  industry
12.  Fondo Nacional  del  Carbon  Law 61/1979  (Article  4)  Value  of  the  production  of  2.80  (565  of  Financing  progrms  of  exploration,
of  coal  at  the  mim  site  52)  exploitation.  tranport.  and
coercialixation  of  coal.
13.  FOCIlE  (Companti  d  Fomento  Law 551985  (Article  15)  Not  value  of  cinem  tickets  161  Encouragement and  development  of
Cin  atografico)  of  the  cineamaraphic  industry
in  Colombia  (8.5Z  for  the  lund
to  encourage  film  making and
7.5X  for  producers.  distribution
and  exhibitions  of  national  wrks).
14.  Caje  Hacional  de  Law 4/196'  (Article  1)  Value  of  payrolls  for  the  Col.S0.10  per  For  social  services
Prevision  Social  governent  (national,  each  $100
departmental,  municipal,  or  fraction
territorial  and special  thereof
district),  police  offices.
and  decontralited  institutione
15.  Superintendencia  de  Law  50/1984  (Art:cle  8)  Public  documents  and  deeds  Fixed  amount in  As of  1986,  207  to  be used  for
Notoriado  *  Registro  Decree  3140/1984  and  peso  construction,  adaptation  and
Low  65/1985  (Article  13)  endowment  of  judicial  courte
and  jails.
16.  Pondo NHcional  de  Cafe  1940  F.O.8.  value  of  coffea  exports  40  uf  expozc  Stabiltoation  of  producer  incomes,
value,  investments  in  economic  end  social
pr.jactt  in  coffee  growing  arease
Retention  on  financial  end  equity  investments;
export  volume  variou  Fund  activities  (e.g.
quality  control,  export  promotion),
61  on inferior
&rades
C.  Denartmental
17.  Fondo  de  Casino.  Decree  190/1969  Consumption  of  beer  in  all  Col.  $0.02  per  Construction,  maintenance  and
Vecinales  (Article  9)  departmet  except  Cundinamrca  bottle  repair  of  1ucsl  roads.
18.  Sectional  Health  Services  ns.  beer,  liquor,  wine  Beer  - 8U  Health  expenditures
Liquor  353
Wim  - 15%
19.  Seet'oa.
1
Health  Services  n.e.  Varioums gabling  profits  Health  expenditures
and Walfare  Agencies  and taxes  and welfare  assistance
(beneficirLcias)
20.  Sectional  Sports  n.e.  Cigarettes  101  ad  velores  Assistance  to  sports.  Of
Co_istions  (Juntas  plus  Col50.S  10  ad  valore.  revenues,  300
Adainistradores  de  per  pack  (domos-  goes  to  Colombian  Institute
Deportee)  tic  *nd  Col.$0.20  of  Youth  and  Sports
per  pack  (imports)  (COLDEPCRTES)  which  in  turn
must  transfer  100  to
Colombion  Institute  of
Culture  (COLCvLTURA)
21. Schools  for  :bo  Blind/  na.  Lottery  prizes  1exeeding  21  Assistance  for  the  blind
National  leder.tion  100  peaso
for  the  blind
D. Municipal
22.  Valorization  tax  for  Law  25/1921  Increase  in  site  value  Amount equal  to  Investmnt  in  v&rioue
variou  municipal  cost  of  invest-  municipal  improvemnts
activi'  lee  sent  and  sea"c-  (e.g.  roa4s water,
iated  expenl  se  swere).-5-
illuminating  the  major  changes  and  their  causes.  To examine  these  trends,
we cre 4te  what is--to  our  knowledge--the  first  comprehunsive  time  series  on
earmarking  at all levels  of government  in  Colombia. The  second  is  an
evaluation  of the  major  examples  of earmarking--what  are  their  objectives
and  how  well do they  work in  practice--with  a  view  toward  making
recommendation3  for  change. In  making  recommendations  for  reducing  the
scope  of earmarking  ir  Colombia,  we  will be guided  by several  principles:
(a)  is  there  a substantial  overlap  between  the  beneficiaries  and  the
tax/price  payers  for  any  given  government  service;  (b)  do the  ta;L/price
arrangements  appear  to be leading  to  appropriate  levels  or the  service  over
time;  and (c)  are  resources  being  utilized  effectively  for  the  purpose
intended. The remainder  of the  paper  is divided  into  four  parts. Part  II
p:esents  time  series  data  on the  size  and  structure  of earmarking  during
the  last  two  decades,  which  shed  light  on the  factors  behind  the  trends  in
earmarking. Prart  III  outlines  some  of the  factors  'ehind  the  popularity  of
earmarking  in  Colombia  and  reviews  the  findings  and  recommendations  of two
major  government  commissions  which  have  examined  the  subject--the  Mission
on Intergovernmental  Finance  of 1981  (or  Bird-Wiesner  Commission)  and  the
Public  Expenditures  Commission  of 1986  (Comision  del  Gasto  Publico). Part
IV  undertakes  a critical  review  of the  major  examples  which  make  up over
902  of total  earmarking. Part  V summarizes  our  major  findings  and  makes
some  recommendations  for  changes.-6-
II.  TRENDS  IN THE  SIZE  AND STRUCTURE  OF EARMARKING  (1970-87)
A.  Size  and  Structure  of Earmarking
5.  Earmarking  (rentas  de destinacion  especifica  or RDEs)  has  long  been
a  prominent  feature  of  Colombian  public  finances. 2 During  the  past two
decades,  the  proportion  of government  revenues  earmarked  has  increased  by
about  one  half  and  the  sources  of earmarking  have  become  more  varied.
In 1970,  RDEs  consticuted  just 11%  of  national  government  revenues  and  were
equally  large  in  size  at the  departmental  level  where  they  formed  a  much
larger  proportion  of  revenues  (see  Table  2).  The  most  prominent  sources  of
earmarking  were beer,  alcohol,  and  lottery  revenues  at the  departmental
level  followed  by the  coffee  expozt  tax  and  gasolir.e  tax  at the  national
level,  and  the  valorization  tax  for  local  improvements.  Together,  these
four  sources  accounted  for  about  89%  of  all  earmarking  (see  Table  3).  In
total,  RDEs constituted  21Z  of revenues  at all  levels  of government.
6.  The  upward  trend  in earmarking  since  1970  has  been the  product
mainly  of greater  earmarking  at  the  central  government  level;  over  the
period,  the  proportion  of  national  government  revenues  earma.ked  tripled
from  11%  to a  peak  of 34%  in 1984  before  falling  off  slightly  in  the  past
three  years  (Table  2).  The  shares  of earmarking  in departmental  and
2/ At first,  our  discussion  will  be confined  to traditional  sources  of
earmarking--i.e.  those  funds  and  revenue  sharing  arrangements  that  are
usually  listed  as earmarking  in  Colombia. La'  r, nontraditional  sources
of  earmarking--payroll  taxes  and  the  operating  profits  of  nonfinancial
enterprises--will  also  be considered.  There  are  two  reasons  for
splitting  the  discussion  in this  fashion. Firet,  the  traditional
sources  are  what is  more  commonly  -hought  of as  earmarking. Secondly,
longer  time  series  were  available  for  the  traditional  earmarking
sources.Table 2  Shares  of Earmarked Revenues  in Government Ravenuesa
(percentages)
1970  1975  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987
Share in National
Government Revenues  11.3  17.5  27.8  27.0  28.3  27.9  34.4  31.3  27.7  27.7
Share in Departmental
Government Revenues  93.9  82.5  88.6  85.8  86.6  85.5  78.3  76.6  76.5
Share in Municipal
Government Revenues  30.1  30.2  31.3  30.5  29.3  33.9  27.0  22.9  16.3b
Share in Government
Revenues All Levels  21.i  23.5  33.4  32.3  31.1  33.5  39.1  35.5  32.0
Source:  Estimates based on Tables  Al and A2 in Statistical Appendix.
a.  Earmarked revenues are listed in Statistical  ADpendix Table A2, excluding payroll taxes, the
operating profits of nonfinancial public enterprises and, at the national level, "other" sources of
earmarking.  Revenues are total tax and non-tax revenues at each level of government; at the national
level, revenues from the 4% ad valorem tax on coffee exports are added 1970-1983,  because the:e
monies did not pass through the budget in those years.
b.  Likely to  be an underestimate due to missing data.
municipal incomes have been generally trending downward over the period.
Between 1970 and 1986 the share of the central government's RDEs ir.  the
total rose from 44% to 75%,  while the shares of the departmental and
municipal governments fell from /-.  to 23% and 9% to 2% respectively.
7.  By far the biggest contr:ibuting  factor to the increase  was the rise
in revenue sharing between levels of government.  "Situado fiscal" and
"cesion a las ventis" contributed about 39% of the total increase in
earmirking over the period.  Other major contributors  were:  departmental
alcohol/tobacco/gambling taxes (23%), the gasoline tax (14%), import duties
to support PROEXPO, IFI and Caja Agraria (11%) and the coffee export tax(5%).3  In addition, there  wao a proliferation of  relativuly minor
RDEs--e.g. hotel taxes to support tourism, taxes on  movie tickets to
support  movie making and culture, taxes on coal producticoln  t-o  *upport
exploration and development, and a variety of others.
8.  By the  mid-1980s, the following six were the major sources of
earmarking in descending order of importance:  revenue sharing (situado
fiscal and cesion a las  ventas), departmental alcohol/tobacco/gambling
taxes, the gasoline tax, the import tax (PROEXPO,  etc.), the coffee export
tax, and the valorizaticn tax.  Together they constituted about 94% of
total earmarking (see Table 3).  Ihe remaining funds (about 20 in number)
individually and even together contribute  very little to total earmarking.
B,  The Effects of Law 55 (1985)
9.  Since Lle  mid-1980s there has been a deliberate governuent effort
to curtail the extent of earmarking, most particularly as the result of
recommendat.ic  !l  v the Ccrmission on Public Expenditurec.  However,
resi,stance,  to  re.i(lt1ions  in  earmarking has been strong and  the  impact  of
measures  taKewn  t.O  date  has  been  limited.  Specifically  Law  55  stipulated
that  the  NCtOUT10l Conc  il.  of  Economics  and  Sorial  Policy  (CONPES)  would
decide  cn the  reassignment  of  funds  from  recipients  of  earmarkinlg  to
3/ While  the  taxes  listed  made  significant  contributicns  to  increases  in
earmarking  over  the  period,  not  all  grew as fast as  total  government
revenues.  We have  already  seen  how  departmental  and  municipal
earmarking  failed  to  keep  pace  with  own  sources  of  revenue at those
levels  of  government.  The  rising  share  of  earmarkirng  in  national
government revenues is explained  by  rising  shares  for  revenue sharing,
PROEXPO (plus IFI and Caja Agraria),  and  (to  a  small  extent)  a  variety
of minor funds  making up for falling shares for the coffee export tax
and gasoline tax.  Together, the former three rose from 2.9% to 21.7% of
national government revenues between 1970 and 1987  while the latter two
fell from  'lZ  to 5.9%.-9-
complementary  or re'ated  activities.  The  RDEs  affected  by Law  55 and  the
activities  to  which  funds  could  be reassigned  are  spelled  out  in Table  4.
The  upper  bounds  or reassignments  were set  at 10%  of earmarked  revenues  in
1985,4  20S  in 1986,  and  rising  in 101  increments  to  a  maximum  of  502 in
1989. In implementing  Law  55,  proposals  would  be  made  by the  relevant
minister  and  the  Chief  of the  National  Planning  Department  based  on
programs  submitted  by the  agencies  receiving  earmarking  funds  and  related
agencies  and  the  final  allocation  would  be  made  by  CONPES  on a case  by case
basis. The  reassignment  could  be effected  by the  earmarking  recipient
agency  itself  carrying  out  the  activ4t'  or,  if it  was  unable,  by
contractual  agreements  with the  government  or  with its  various  public
crganization  or enterprises.
10.  Law 55 resulted  in the  reallocation  of Col.$30  billion  and  52
billion  in 1986  and 1987  (Table  5),  the  equival.ent  of 11.9%  and  15.2%  of
total  earmarking  at the  national  leval  in  the  two  years  respectively.  If
these  amounts  were  r-moved  the  remaining  earmarking  at the  natioral  level
would  have  constituted  24%  of national  revenues  in the  two  years  (in
contrast  to the  28% figures  repcrted  in  Table  2).  Particularly  significant
amounts--both  absolutely  and  relative  to total  earmarking--were  involved  in
the  cases  of PROEXPO,  the  gasoline  tax,  ICBF  and  SENA.
4/  The limit  for  PROEXPO  was set  at 20%  for  1985  after  which  it  would
follow  the  same  schedule  as  other  funds.- 10  -
Table 3  Share of Various Traditional Earmarked Funds in Total Earmarked lundsa 1970-86 a/
(percentages)
1970  1975  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986
Ltional  Level  44.7  65.2  72.2  72.4  74.7  70.8  71.9  73.5  74.7
Tax  on  Impo.ts  C.I.F.  1.3  4.1  8.1  7.5  8.4  6.8  8.5  8.5  10.5
Caja Agraria  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.1  1.1  1.2
IFI  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.1  1.1  1.2
PROEXPO  1.3  4.0  7.3  6.7  7.5  6.0  6.3  6.3  8.1
Gasoline Tax  14.2  8.9  20.8  21.1  18.1  15.3  13.5  14.8  13.8
Fondo Vial Nacional
(FVN) 752  1C.7  6.7  15.6  15.8  13.5  11.5  10.5  9.9  9.7
Fondo de Caminos
Vec!nalea (FCN) 102  1.4  0.9  2.1  2.1  1.8  1.5  1.2  2.0  1.6
Ferrocarrilea
Nacional  102  1.4  0.9  2.1  2.1  1.8  1.5  1.2  2.0  1.6
Corp. Fin de
Tranaporte  52  0.7  0.4  1.0  1.1  0.9  0.8  0.6  0.9  0.8
Tax  on  International
Travel  0.7  n.a.  1.1  1.5  1.9  1.7  1.5  1.4  1.0
42  Tax  Coffee  Exports  19.1  12.9  4.4  3.2  2.7  2.6  2.8  3.3  5.3
Fondo  Nacional  del  Cafe  n.a.  n.a.  3.7  2.7  ,.
3 2.2  2.3  2.8  4.4
Fedecafe,  zonas
cafeterias  n.a.  n.a.  0.7  0.5  0.4  0.4  0.5  0.5  0.9
2  Tax  on  Tourism  0.0  0.7  0.4  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.1  0.1  0.1
6I Tax  on  Movie
Theater Tickets  0.0  0.0  0 0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1
ontributions and
Participations  2.8  2.2  1.5  1.0  1.6  1.9  1.9  3.0  2.1
pecial Funds  0.1  0.5  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.4  0.6  1.2  2.4 b/
Revenue Sharing  6.4  35.9  35.7  37.7  41.4  41.7  43.1  41.2  38.9
Tax Transfer  0.0  23.4  23.8  27.4  28.3  29.9  28.7  25.9  22.5
Sales Tax  Allowance  6.4  12.5  11.9  10.3  13.1  11.8  14.3  15.3  16.5
mnartment  Level  46.7  29.5  23.4  23.1  21.0  23.8  23.5  22.7  23.2
inicival  Level  8.6  5.3  4.4  4.5  4.3  5.4  4.6  3.8  2.1 c/
See  footnote  to  Table  2  for  definitions.
Includes  some  miscellaneous reallocations under Law 55.
Understated  because  of  missing  data.
Durce:  Estimates based on Table A2 in Statistical  Appendix.- 11  -
11.  There are a number of reasons  why the foregoing overstates the
reduction in earmarking actually achieved by Law 55.  First, Law 55 did
not--and  was nout  intended to--tree up earmarked money t:o  be isod entirely
at  the central government's discretion.  The alternatives  fcr  wh;i.;h  monies
could be used were carefully spelled out and narrowly limitea tc activities
in the same sector.  Secondly,  while intending to free up budgetary
resources,  Law 55 actually created two new (relatively small) earmarked
funds--the tax on cinema tickets and the fees on registration of public
documents.  Moreover, in subsequent  years, still further RDEs have been
established e.g., the allocation of the VAT on cement for housing and
water/sewerage and the national valorization tax on public works to be
allocated for municipalities.  Lastly, in numerous cases, the earmarkir.g
recipient agen.cies  have ended up carrying out the activities  mandated by
Law 55 the-seives.  AD examples, the Law 55 stipulation  that  a  port.ion  of
gascii4no  t ax re'enues  be used for road  maintenance and repo-ale tirvely
keeps the  _:-Fs with'n the highway fund (Fondo  Vial Nacioni.).  M;n-v  of Law
55 pro4e½ts  irtle-rated  rural  development  or  in  trainng  -. r  he  Ministry
of  Education  are  carried cut by  SENA itself  on  a  cont.rac  basis;  since  other
agencies  are  n-. pre  par&-d  to  carry  out  the  work.  While  son-.o of  lCBFs
mc..es  eore  rea!  ^ccated  tc  Ministry  of  HealLh  programs  (e.sg.  Va7ciations,
chldren  's h* s.p.tals,  mal.aria  control)  in  1985-87,  thereafter  ICBFs  Law  55
money  will  We `edicated  tc its  own  "hogares"  (hcusehoid)  progran  .9f
nutrition  and  daycare  support  (see paragraph  62).  In sum,  the  reallocation
of resources  under  Law  55 is in reality  much  smaller  than  appears  on the
surface;  only in the case of PROEXPO has there been a significant shift of
resources (i4n  this case, out of subsidized  export credit toward a separate
program c  t  expert subsidies).- 12  -
Table 4  Potential Reallocations Under Law 55 (1985)
Organization or  Recipients of
or Agency  Earmarked Source  Reallocation
1.  National Highway Fund  Tax on gasoline  Construction; maintenance
and National Fund for  and valorization  and repair of national
Neighborhood Roads  tax on national  niighways  and local roads;
public works  and improvements in river
navigation.
2. National Aeronautical  Stamp tax on sales  Ai-port activities and those
Funds  aboard and airport tax,  activities listed in 1 above.
3.  PROEXPO  62 tax on CIF value  Funding of CERTS (tax refund
of imports  certificates  and  other
instrmnents  to promote
exports)
4. IFI  Tax  on cif  value  Small-scale  industry,  timber
of imports  industry,  and fisheries.
5. National  Tourism  Tourism  tax  Preservation  and restoration
Corporation  of national  monuments  and
parks;  prcmotion  of cottage
industry;  and  the  financing
of tourism  development
certificatee.
6. National  Coal  Fund  Coal  production  tax  Finance  of  mining  investi-
gation and exploration
activities.
7.  Notary and Registration  Duties on the registration  Finance of investments  for
Superintendency  of public instruments  conatruction; irnprovement
and issuance of notary  and equipping of judicial
certificates  offices  and  priscn  faci-
lities.
8. Hotion  Picture Promotion  A  new 162 tax on cinema  8.52 of the tax amount to
ticket prices  be paid into the Motion
Picture Promotion Fund to
be managed by the Motion
Picture Development Company
and used to finance cultural
and artistic programs.  The
remaining 7.52 shall be paid
to producers, distributors,
and exhibitors of Colombian
films in proportions  esta-
blished by government with
greater amounts going for
full length features.
9.  SENA  (National Apprentice-  Payroll tax  Training geared to jobs,
ship Service)  technical and small industry
and agriculture  extension.
SENA  to  assume  responsibility
for financing,  in full or in part,
industrial schools and technical
institutes, colleges, agricultural
training schools, and computer and
telemetrics  programs.
10.  ICBF  (Colombia  Family  Payroll  Taxes  Child  and  Family  protection
Welfare  Institute)  programs;  vaccination  and
prevention  health  programs;
food  assistance  programs  for
India communities; public
nursing homes; and also the
maintenance  of  children's
hospitals  and  construction  of
water  supply  infrastructure  in
comnunity with  less the 60,000
inhabitants  (based on 1973 census)
Source: LEY 55 Por  medio  de la  cual  se  dictan  normas  tendientes  ai ordenamiento  de las
Finanzas del Estado  y  se dictan otras disposiciones; June 18, 1985.- 13  -
Table 5  Reallocation of Earmarked Funds Under  Law 55/85, 1986-89
(millions  of Colombian current pesos)
1986  1987  1988  1989
Donor  Budget  Actual  Budget  Actual  Budget  Budget
PROEXPO  6,651.0  5,408.0  10,503.0  20,744.0  31,120.0  42,000.0
ICBF  3,100.0  2,635.0  3,300.0  1,145.0  0.0  19,315.0a
SENA  2,286.0  2,449.0  2,980.0  2,984.0  0.0  19,500o0a
FAN  990.0  500.0  1,000.0  332.0  696.0  850.0
Supernotariado Y Registro  910.0  677.0  1,510.0  1,315.0  1,750.0  1,750.0
Fondo Rotatorio De Aduanas  0.0  56.0  359.0  70.0  350.0  570.0
Corturismo  278.0  242.0  643.0  643.0  404.0  582.8
Focine  35.0  146.0  32.0  164.0  185.1
Fondo Nacional Del Carbon  556.0  139.0  775.0  297.0  649.0  926.2
Gasolina  ACPHb  9,683.0  9,937.0  17,556.0  17,880.0  25,492.0  40,324.0
Reallocations among various
agencies  (LEY 55/85)C  3,453.0  3,164.0  1,245.0  1,157.0  1,555.0  2,969.0
Ecopetrol (Decree 399/86)  5,120.0  5,120.0  5,500.0  5,500.0  5,500.0
Instituto De Fomento
Industrial  970.0
TOTAL  33,027.0  30,362.0  45,517.0  52,099.0  67,680.0  129,942.1
a.  ICBF will reallocate this amount  within its budget to a program that is a government priority
(Children's  Welfare Homes).  SENA will reallocate this within its budget to special government
programs.
b.  Estimates based on Law 55/85 percentages.
c.  Several agencies included.
Source:  Contraloria General de la Republica for actual figures and Departmento Nacional de
Planeacion for budget figures.
C.  Consideration of Social Security and Public Enterprise Profits
12.  Focussing on the traditional sources of earmarking--as in Tables 2
and 3 above--understates the true extent of the earmarking of public funds
in Colombia.5 Public enterprise profits and the payroll tax for social
security and SENA, ICBF, etc. are the  major reasons for th- understatement.
Net profits of public enterprises (i.e.  gross receipts net of operating
5/ Qu!2"e  apart f.om the fact that some relatively  minor funds are not
included in our data.- 14 -
expenses and taxes paid to government)  may be considered earmarking because
they are left to the control of the enterprises despite the fact that they
are owned in  whole or in part by the government; that is, the government
cannot or in practice does not attempt to allocate such resources at irt
discretion.  Similarly, payroll taxes for social security imply an
obligation to pay pensions and medical expenses now and in the future and
the government has no discretion about how payroll tax receipts are to be
used.  Depending on the rates charged relative to the mortality and
morbidity problems faced  by the population, present revenues  may be greater
or less than the present payment obligations.  That part of the payroll tax
that is allocated to SENA and ICBF commits the public monies to funding a
variety of activities in training, nutrition, daycare, and social  welfare.
In reality, therefore, such profits and payroll taxes are little different
than the traditional cases of earmarking.
Table  6  Shares  of Traditional and Non-Traditional  Earmarkina in PublIc Incomea
(incl. social security and  public  enterprises profits)
(percentages)
1970  1975  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987
Share  in  national
public  income  28.6  31.8  39.3  38.2  43.3  43.0  54.2  49.9  44.9  46.0
Share  in  departmental
public  income  90.9  88.5  89.3  88.4  82.0  80.8
Share  in  municipal
public  income  61.4  65  0  65.9  67.9  63.4  67.2
Share  in  Public  Income
All levels  45.5  44.6  48.7  49.1  57.8  54.6
a.  Public  income  is the  sum  of tax and non-tax revenues, operating  profits  of  public  non-financial
enterprises, and payroll taxes for social security and for SENA, ICBF, etc.  The ad valorem coffee
export tax is added to national public income 1970-83 since these revenues did not pass through the
budget in those years.  The earmarking considered here is traditional earmarking plus non-traditional
earmarking which includes non-financial public enterprise profits and payroll taxes for social security
and SENA, ICJF, etc.
Source:  Estimates based on Tables  Al and A2 in Statistical Appendix.- 15 -
13.  The result  of adding  these  non-traditional  sources  of earmarking  to
the  traditional  sources  is  shown  in  Tables  6 and  7 for  the  period  1980  to
1985. The  extent  of  earmarking  in  public  income 6 is,  of course  larger  at
all  levels  of government  but,  most  particularly,  at the  national  and
municipal  levels. The  upward  trend  in  earmarking  is  still  also  clear,  most
particularly  at the  national  level  where  data  is  available  for  1970-87.
Earmarking  in total  public  income  was 462  in 1980  and  rose  to  55Z  or  more
in 1984  and 1985. Over  the  period,  the  share  of  earmarking  contributed  by
payroll  taxes  and  public  enterprise  operating  profits  has  been increasing
while  the  share  contributed  by traditional  RDEs has  been  falling;  by the
end  of  the  period  the  split  between  traditional  and  non-traditional  sources
of earmarking  was  roughly  fifty-fifty.  Increasing  public  enterprise
profits  at the  national  and  municipal  level  have  been  the  major  cause  of
this  trend. In 1985,  the  major  contributors  to  traditional  plus
non-traditional  earmarking  were in descending  order  of importance:  public
enterprise  profits  (27Z),  payroll  taxes  for  social  security  and  SENA/ICBF
(24Z),  revenue  sharing  (20%),  departmental  alcohol/tobacco/gambling  taxes
(11%),  gasoline  tax (71),  import  duties  for  PROEXPO,  etc (41),  the
municipal  valorization  tax (2Z)7  and  the  ad  valorem  tax  on  coffee  exports
(2%). Together  these  eight  sources  account  for  about  97%  of total
earmarking.  Out  of the  large  number  of other  cases  of  earmarking,  no
single  source  contributes  as  much  as one  percent  to the  total.
6/ Public  income  is derived  by adding  to the  tax  and  non-tax  revenues  used
in  Table  2 the  net  operating  profits  of  non-financial  enterprises  and
payroll  taxes.
7/  Also includes  Bogota's  taxes  on beer  and  tobacco.- 16  -
Table 7  Share of Various Traditional and Non-traditonal
Earmarkina Sources in Total Earmarking. 1980-85 a/
1980  '981  1982  1983  1984  1985
Natianal  72.5  71.6  75.2  72.5  75.4  73.3
Traditional Earmarking  44.6  43.7  40.6  37.6  35.4  36.3
Tax on Imports C.I.F.  4.9  4.4  4.5  3.5  4.1  4.1
Gasoline Tax  12.5  12.3  9.6  7.9  6.5  7.2
Tax on International
Travel  0.7  0.9  1.0  0.9  0.7  0.7
Coffee Export Tax  2.7  1.9  1.4  1.3  1.3  1.6
Tax on Tourism  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.1  0.0
Tax on Movie Tickets  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Contributions and
Participation  0.9  0.6  0.8  1.0  0.9  1.5
Special Funds  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.3  0.6
Revenue Sharing  21.6  22.1  21.9  21.6  20.7  19.9
Tax Allowance  14.3  16.1  15.0  15.5  13.8  12.5
Sales Tax  7.3  6.0  6.9  6.1  6.9  7.4
Other  1.1  1.2  1.0  1.1  0.9  0.8
Non-Traditional Earmarking  27.9  27.9  34.6  34.9  40.0  37.0
Payroll Taxes  22.0  23.2  21.6  25.3  23.4  22.2
Social Security  16.4  17.6  16.0  19.5  17.9  17.1
SENA, ICBF, etc.  5.6  5.6  5.6  5.8  5.5  5.1
Operating Profits
of Non-Financial
Public Enterprises  5.9  4.7  13.0  9.6  16.6  14.8
Departments  18.2  17.3  14.4  15.9  14.2  14.1
Traditional Earmarking  '4.1  13.5  11.1  12.3  11.3  11.0
Non-Traditonal Earmarkin&
Social Security  1.1  1.2  1.0  1.1  0.7  1.1
Operating Profits of
Non-Financial
Public Enterprises  3.0  2.6  2.3  2.5  2.2  2.0
Municipal  9.4  11.1  10.4  11.5  10.4  12.6
Traditional Earmarking  2.7  2.6  2.2  2.8  2.2  1.8
Non-Traditional Earmarking
Social Security  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.7  0.6  0.6
Operating Profits
of Non-Financial
Public Enterprises  6.2  8.0  7.7  8.0  7.6  10.2
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Traditional Earmarking
(All Levels)  61.4  59.8  53.9  52.7  49.0  49.1
Non-Traditional Earmarking
(All Levels)  38.6  40.2  46.1  47.3  51.0  50.9
a.  See  footnote  to  Table  6 for  definitions.
Source:  Estimates based on data in Table A2 in Statistical  Appendix.- 17 -
III. THE  EXPERIENCE  OF EARMARKING
A.  The  Orizins  of  Earmarking
14.  The  extent  of earmarking  found  in  Colombia  is the  product  of
several  important  features  of its  politics--decentralization,  political
instability,  and  an elaborate  budgetary  process. Since  Independence,  its
politics  have  been  dominated  by powerful  and  opposing  political  forces
favoring  centralization  and  decentralization  of  power. Over  the  long  sweep
of one  hundred  or  more  years,  centralization  has  been  the  dominant
tendency,  producing  a central  government  that  carries  out  the  majority  of
public  activities,  collects  an  even  larger  share  of  public  incomes,  and
dominates  the  decisionmaking  process  on  economic  and  social  questions. In
the  last  two  decades,  however,  there  have  been  greater  efforts  at
decentralization,  the  hiving  off  of government  activities  to special
agencies  and  to lower  levels  of government.  This  has  necessitated  a shift
in  public  revenues--partly  on  a discretionary  basis  and  partly  on a  more
automatic  basis  through  the  sharing  of government  revenues  or the  setting
aside  of  particular  revenue  sources  for  particular  activities.
15.  Colombia's  political  history  has  also  been  dominated  by strong
opposing  forces,  producing  periods  of extreme  tension  and  often  violence.
In a climate  of uncertainty--where  the  political  situation  can  shift
abruptly  and  sharply,  earmarking  provides  a  means  for  providing  somewhat
greater  certainty  that  certain  important  activities  will  be carried  out.
The  wishes  of one  administration  or congress  will  be carried  on to the  next
unless  explicit  measures  are  taken  to stop  the  activity.
16.  Last,  but  very important,  is  the  budgetary  process. The  process
has  been  designed  on the  premise  that  carelessness  and  outright  dishonesty- 18 -
are prevalent; unless checked,  monies are likely to be mismanaged and/or
diverted to personal use or uses not intended  by the executive or congress.
Elaborate procedures have been set up to assure that this does not occur.
17.  Sevetal aspects of the budget process have been relevant to
explaining the popularity of earmarking. 8 First is that initial budgets
bear little relation to final budgets.  While initial budgets may have been
carefully prepared in line  with the government's  medium-term objectives,
they are constrained by artificial limits on estimates of revenue increases
and the requirement of budget balance, necessitating several additional
budgets each year.  During the additions,  political pressures, short-term
emergencies (e.g. unforeseen losses in public agencies), and lack of time
appear to overwhelm the planning process leading to a final budget that is
different in total (often 251 or  more) and composition than the original.
Second, the authorization process by which monthly allocations of allowable
expenditures are made leads to considerable  uncertainty.  "Authorizations"
are based on estimates of monthly available resources by the Ministry of
Finance, the resulting giros issued by ministries and agencies become
payment orders only  when countersigned  by the Inspector-General
(Contraloria)  which checks to see  whether resources exist, and payment is
actually made by Treasury only if resources are in fact available.  Since
there is considerab-  pressure to pay government salaries, debt service
obligations, transfer payments ard other seeming essentials (defense,
security), the investment program bears the brunt of short-term
adjustments.  Lastly, recipients of budgetary resources have to pass
through elaborate and time-consuming  controls designed to prevent the
8/ The following statements  would have to be modified somewhat in light of
the new budget law.  See paragraph 71.- 19  -
diversion  of funds. Through  pre-audit  (control  previo),  Contraloria
attempts  to check  each  item  of  expenditure  to ensure  that  it is  in
accordance  with the  government's  intentions,  but  it is  not  clear  that  these
procedures  do  prevent  the  misuse  of funds  or,  more importantly,  ensure  that
on balance  the  funds  are  being  used  effectively  to forward  the  government's
objectives.
18.  For  agencies  faced  with this  process,  earmarking  has  a number  of
advantages. 9 It  gives  them  greater  certainty  about  the  amount  and  timing
of resources  they  will receive  during  the  year.  It is easier  for  them  to
forecast  the  amounte  of the  earmarked  tax (even  acknowledging  possible
errors  in those  forecasts)  than  to forecast  the  outcome  of  the  budgetary
process  during  the  year. Moreover,  procedures  are  easier  for  earmarked
funds. Earmarked  taxes  may  be collected  by the  Division  of National  Taxes
and  distributed  to the  relevant  agency  or,  in  some  cases  collected  directly
by  the  agency  itself. In either  case,  earmarked  monies  are  subject  to far
less  detailed  controls  th i  general  budgetary  resources. In sum,
earmarking  gives  recipients  more  certainty  about  available  resources,
allowing  them  to  plan  their  spending  programs  more effectively  and  to enter
into  longer-term  contractual  arrangements.
B.  Recommendations  of Previous  Government  Commissions
19.  The  Commission  on Intergovernmental  Finances  of 1981  (the  Bird-
Wiesner  Report)1 0 took  a generally  skeptical  view of the  earmarking  of
taxes,  but recognized  that  such  earmarking  had  its  origins  in  the  weakness
of  Colombian  budgetary  processes  and  could  be justified--in  some  cases--by
9/  These  points  were cited  in  numerous  interviews  with officials  from
agencies  that  are  recipients  of earmarked  fund.
10/  Interaovernmental  Finance  in  Colombia  - Final  ReDort  of the  Mission  on
Intertovernmental  Finance  (International  Tax  Program: Harvard  Law
School;  Cambridge,  Massachusetts;  1984).- 20 -
appeal to public finance principles.  Budgetary processes are designed to
curb deviations and dishonesty and the result is bothersome, time-consuming
and uncertain.  Earmarking provides sim,pler  and clearer procedures and more
certain outcomes.  The Bird-Wiesner  Report took the pragmatic  view that a
more perfect world of rational budget processes moving resources to their
highest-priority uses is not readily obtainable and earmarking  may be
justified because it  works and because it protects priorities.  Thus Bird-
Wiesner approached earmarking on a case-by-case basis asking whether the
following criteria  were fulfilled: (a) is the benefit principle involved
with a clear identity of tax/price  payers and beneficiaries (i.e. it is not
appropriate to use earmarking  where benefits are not easily assigned or
where income redistribution objective- are involved); (b)  does earmarking
provide the sole source of financing (or,  at least the preponderance of
funds) for the entity involved;  where large amounts of funds from the
general budget are involved, earmarking may not be doing any harm but it is
also not clear that it is having any impact on the allocation of resources;
and (c) is there a match between the revenues generated and requirements of
the recipient agency or is there a systematic tendency for the tax/pricing
procedures to under- or over-fund activities.
20.  With these criteria in  mind, the Bird-Wiesner Report made a nunber
of recoummendations: 11
o  Earmarking which takes the form of allocating a fixed
percentage of total government expenditures (or total
government revenues) to a specified activity (e.g. justice or
education in Colombia's national budget) serves  no justifiable
purpose and should be eliminated.
11/ Ibid, pp.  111-114 and pp. 379-380.- 21 -
o  Revenue sharing arrangements  between levele of government may
be justified but the sharing formulas need to be modified to
assure that no jurisdiction obtains amounts in excess of its
needs.
O  Some uses of the payroll tax can be clearly justified on
benefit principle grounds (e.g.,  SENA) but others (e.g.  ICBF
and the Cajas de Compensacion) clearly cannot and in  no case
was it clear that the payroll taxes  were generating the
appropriate amount of resources for the sector.
O  Earmarking of taxes with no clear benefit rationale ought to
be abolished; this would eliminate, for example, the use of
departmental taxes on beer and alcohol for the health sector
or the use of tobacco and amusement taxes to support sports.
O  There is no justification for leaving  public enterprise sector
profits at the disposition of the enterprise and public
enterprises should be subject to income taxes.
21.  Since the Bird-Wiesner  Report, there appears to be growing pressure
to eliminate or at least substantially reduce the role of earmarking in
Colombia.  Starting from the same set of criteria as Bird-Wiesner, the
Comision del Gasto Publico (1986)  comes to a much harsher conclusion.
Having examined  most of the prominent cases of earmarking, it finds that
cases of identity  between payers and beneficiaries are in fact the
exception (only  the funds for highways and aviation seem to fit this
criterion very closely); cases of extremely tenuous or non-existent
connections predomainate  (even  SENA and PROEXPO fail to produce a
significant overlap).  Moreover, the Commission is very skeptical of the
argument justifying earmarking by reference to Colombia's inefficient
budget processes.  Given these inefficiencies it may be desirable, from any- 22 -
agency's  point of view to obtain earmarked resources, but there is no
evidence chat recipients of earmarked resources are more efficient than
other agencies or that--given the lack of identity between payozs and
beneficiaries--the appropriate amount of resources is being allocated to
these sectors.  Hence, it is not clear that earmarking leads to an
efficiency gain from the point of view of the country.
22.  On the basis of the above arguments, the Commission concludes: (3)
earmarking should be eliminated; 12 (b)  the budgets of all agencies ought to
be subject to the same budgetary process; (c) improvements in the
administration of the revenue sharing arrangements appear to be desirable.
While not pursuing this  matter further, the Commission also expressed
concern over the effects of payroll taxes on the cost of labor and hence
upon employment.
IV.  AN EVALUATION OF EARMARKING
A.  Revenue Sharing
23.  One of the prominent characteristics of Colombian pubiic finance is
the significant transfer of revenues between levels of government and from
the  various levels to a number of decentralized  agencios.  In the main, the
flow is from the central government proper to its own decentralized
agencies and to lower levels of government and their decentralized
agencies.  Part of the transfers are discretionary, the amounts being
decided each year as part of the budgetary process, but a growing
proportion of transfers are automatic, the result of turning over revenues
from specified taxes or fees to decentralized agencies and the sharing of
12/ Reference hers seems to be to a subset of earmarking that excludes
revenue sharing, payroll taxes (except for SENA, ICBF, and the Cajas de
Compensacion Familiar), and the profits of public enterprises.- 23 -
revenies between levels of government according to predetermined rules.
The dominant factors in the latter have been the tax allowance (situado
fiscal) and the sales tax transfer (cesion  de ventas or IVA).  Together,
their share in central government RDEs and in central government current
revenues grow from 14 to 56Z and 2? to 15Z between 1970 and 1987.  The tax
allowance is roughly a third larger than the sales tax t-:ansfer,  but the
latter has been growing more rapidly in recent years.
1.  The Tax Allowance (Situado  Fiscal)
24.  The tax allowance  was implemented through Law 46 of 1971  which
followed from Article 182 of the Colombia Constitution of 1968  which
provided that a portion of annual ordinary revenues 13 be allocated among
departmenti, national territories, and the Special District of Bogota  with
30% to be shared equally among 33 jurisdictions and 70% to be divided on
the basis of population shares as they appeared in the 1964 census.  Law 46
called for the share to be 13Z, 14%, and 15% in 1973, 1974 and 1975,
thereafter increasing  by 2% per annum to a maximum of 25% provided that
ordinary revenues were rising by at least 15%  per year.  These 2% increases
were never formally implemented and so the sharing formula remains at 15%;
as will be shown below, the amounts actually shared have fluctuated around
that limit.
25.  Law 46 also stipulates that 74% of the amount transferred each year
shall be used to fund the operating costs of primary education and 26% to
finance those of the health sector.  These funds are a major source of
finance for primary education and make a significant contribution to the
financing of health.  The national government retains the right to alter
13/ Ordinary revenues are defined as current revenues not earmarked by
legislation for any specific purpose or use.- 24 -
the split between education and health, but has not done so specifically.
The departmental and territorial government  have a legal obligation to
provide, in addition to the tax allowance, the same share of their ordinary
income to finance primary education and health operating costs as they
provided in 1972.  According to the law, the funds provided through the tax
allowance are to be administered through the Regional Education Funds
(Fondos  Educativos Regionales or "FERs") and Section Health Services
(Servicios  Seccionales de Salud or "SSSs").  Despite the seeming tightness
of the legal provisions for implementing the tax allowance, there has been
considerable room for flexibility in how they have been interpreted.  There
are a number of reasons for this:  first the 7 -uirements  of individual
FERs and SSSs  are considered and the amounts are totalled to  make sure that
they do not exceed the amount available to be distributed.  Second,  where
the sum of the tax allowance and local resources in any jurisdiction is not
sufficient to meet requirements, supplements  can be added.  Similarly  where
th?re are excesses, the excess may be diverted to the finance of investment
with the apprcval of the  Ministry of Finance.  Third, the process of
additions to the initial budget distorts the process still further since
the additions do not follow the sharing formula precisely.
26.  As a result, there is considerable  variation in the proportion
shared, the share going to each jurisdiction, and the split between
education and health by jurisdiction or in total.  These results show up
clearly in statistical  Appendix Tables A3 through  A5.  Table A3 shows that
the share of the tax allowance in ordinary revenues (current  revenues minus
earmarked taxes) has mostly been above the 15Z level in the last decade.
Starting from about 12% in 1975 it rose to a peak of 242 by 1984 before
falling back sharply.  While according to a strict interpretation of the
sharing formula, each jurisdiction  would obtain a constant share of the- 25  -
total tax allowance each year (since  the numb.r of jurisdictions is fixed
and each jurisdiction's share in the 1964  population is fixed), Table A4
shows that jurisdictional shares exhibit considerable  year to year
fluctuations.  Moreover, there appear to be a number of patterns in the
data:
o  Departments consistently receiving  more than implied by the sharing
formula:  Antioquia, Bogota, Choco, Cordoba, Cundinamarca, Norte
Santander, Santander.
o  Departments consistently receiving less than implied by the sharing
formula:  Atlantico, Bolivar, Boyaca, Caldas, Cauca, Magdalena, Narino,
Quindio, Risaralda, Sucre, Valle de Cauca.
0  The territories' share in the tax allowance is always greater than
their share in population but they consistently (approximately  85Z of
cases) obtain less than implied  by the sharing formula.
The remaining departments have had a more mixed experience of positive and
negative differences from amounts implied by the sharing formula.  Lastly,
Table P5 shows that the shares devoted to education and health in the tax
allowance have deviated--quite often substantially--from the formula.  For
the total, education shares have varied from a low of 71% (1986) to a high
of 802 (1980)  with health shares, of course,  varying conversely.  For
individual  jurisdict 4 ons, the variations have been even wider.
27.  While the flexibility  with which the situado fiscal sharing formula
has been applied is  welcome, the formula contains a number of flaws
--regarding its treatment of small  versus large population areas and its
failure to provide incentives for devartmental resource  mobilization--which
should be corrected.  First, the sharing formula for the tax allowance
favors less populated jurisdictions at the expense of more populated areas
as compared with a formula based on population alone.  The full dimensions- 26 -
of the bias toward areas with smaller  popLtations may not be appreciated,
however.  Given the shares to be allocated on population and non-population
bases, the formula says that all jurisdictions  whose population is greater
than 3.03% of Colombia's population will share in the tax allowance in a
lower proportion than their share in total population  while all those  with
populations less than 3.03%  will obtain shares in the tax allowance that
are higher than their share in total population. 14 Thus Antioquia with
14.2% of the population gets 10.85Z  of the tax allowance and Boyaca  with
6.1% gets 5.18% while Sucre  with 1.8%  gets 2.17% and San Andres with 0.1%
gets 0.98%.  Put another  way, according to the sharing formula, the per
capita transfer th.:t  a jurisdiction receives  varies inversely  with its
share in the total population.  The potential variance will be larger, the
larger is the non-population based factor in the sharing formula.  Thus,
the per capita amount received can be ranked  with the highly populated
areas (e.g. Antioquia, Bogota) at the bottom and the small territories at
the top.  As compared with Antioquia (14.2' of the 1964 population)
residents of Norte de Santander (3.1%  of the population) would receive 30%
more; Sucre (1.8% of population) 58% more; Caqueta (0.6% of population)
190% more; and San Andres 1180%  more.  However desirable it might be to
14/ Given that 30% of the tax allowance formula is shared equally by
jurisdictions and 70% is allocated on the basis of population and that
there are 33 jurisdictions, the difference between a formula based on
population  and  the  present  tax  allowance  formula  is Pi _  3  +  .7  Pi 
Pop  33  Pop
_.3  Pi  _  3  ,  when  Pi is the population  of the  ith
Pop  33
jurisdiction  and  Pop  is  total  population.  This  expression  is  zero  when
the population share of the ith district is 3.03%,  positive for greater
population shares, and negative for smaller.  Note that the point at  which
the expression is zero depends solely on the number of jurisdictions and
is independent of the shares allocated on a population and non-population
basis.- 27 -
make some additional resources available for smaller areas (say to create
and maintain a critical minimum level of public education and health
services or to compensate for the dispersion of population), it would be
better to do so on the basis of estimated costs of compensating for
smallness.  The differential gains and losses for various jurisdictions
cited above is not related to wealth or poverty in any systematic  way and
cannot be justified on any rational basis.15
28.  A second flaw in the application of the formula is the continued
use of the 1964 census for the population-based  part of the formula.  This
would favor those jurisdictions  whose populations have grown relatively
slowly at the expense of rapidly growing areas.  It would be desirable to
use the 1985 census when applying the formula.
29.  The third flaw in the sharing formula is that it fails to encourage
greater resource mobilization efforts at the local level.  The formula
needs to be altered such that the amount of transfer received by any
jurisdiction dependa in some degree on the amount of resource it
contributes.  As it stands, the tax allowance is a conditional, close-
ended, non-matching grant.1 6 Conditional because the funds must be used
for education and health.  Close-ended  because the total amount to be
15/ Some acditional noticr.  of the arbitrariness of the formula may be
obtained from recognition of the fact that the cutoff population
share--separating jurisdictions receiving above- and below-average per
capita transfers--depends solely on the number of jurisdictions.  The
number presently stands at 3.03: because there are 33 jurisdictions,
but if--for whatever reason--Colombia should decide to consolidate to
(say) 16  jurisdictions, the cutoff population would become 6.251 and
areas  would  begin  receiving  higher  or lower  per  capita  amounts  for  no
reason  other  than  a change  in  the  number  of departments/territories.
16/  See  R.M.  Bird,  Intergovernmental  Finance  in  Colombia--Final  Report  of
the  Mission  on Interaovernment  Finance  (International  Tax  Program,  Law
School  of  Harvard  University,  Cambridge,  Massachusetts,  1984),  pp.
148-153 and N.E. Slack and R.M. Bird "Local Response to
Intergovernmental  Fiscal  Transfers--The  Case  of  Colombia"  Public
Finance  (No.  3, 1983),  pp. 429-437.- 28  -
shared is fixed even though the shares of individual jurisdictions  may
vary.  Non-matching because the amount received by any jurisdiction is set
independently,  unrelated to its revenues or expenditures.  That is, the
requirement that jurisdictions spend the same proportion of their income on
education and health as in 1972 has never really  been enfotced and while
jurisdictions are expected to contribute to educatior.  and health
expenditures there is no formula relating these to the size of the transfer
received from the national government.  As constituted, the sharing formula
does not further resource allocation or income distribution objectives in
any systematic fashion.  If the objective  were to encourage increased
resources in education and health, the appropriate formula  would be
conditional, open-ended and matching.  On the other hand, if the objective
were to reallocate resources to poorer jurisdictions or jurisdictions with
lower tax bases, the formula should be unconditional not conditional.
Moreover, as was shown above, the formula favors jurisdictions  with smaller
populations in a rather capricious fashion unrelated in any systematic way
to needs or to poverty.  Lastly, it is clear that the formula does not
encourage greater tax effort on the part of departments and available
evidence suggests that tax effort has been reduced.  For exa'mple,  a 1978
study by the Foundation for Higher Education and Development (FEDESARROLLO)
found that the non-matching nature of the formula  would in general tend to
discourage local effort and that the tax allowance  has had no effect on the
level of department expenditures in education and health.1 7 A study done
by Slack and Bird, as part of their background  work for the 1981  Mission on
17/ Fundaci6n Para la Educaci6n Superior y el Desarrollo "El Efecto del
Situado Fiscal y la Cesion del Impoventas Sobre los Ingresos y la
Estructura del Gasto Departmental y Municipal" (unpublished,  Bogota,
October 1978).- 29 -
Intergovernmental Finance, shows that a one peso increase in the tax
allowance leads to an increase in expenditures less than one third of 1% as
large, suggesting that the tax allowance substitutes for local resources.18
2.  Sales Tax Transfer (Cesion  a las ventas)
30.  The sales tax transfer was created by Law 33 of 1968  which provided
that the departments and Special District of Bogota  would share in the
revenues from the national sales tax starting at 10% in 1969 and rising to
202 in 1970 and 302 in 1971 and thereafter.  Through a series of laws
during the 1970s, the uses to  which the monies could be put and :he
proportions devoted to each  were altered but basically these resources were
devoted to social security pensions (departmental),  secondary education,
and most importantly, the  municipalities.19 As it stood before the change
introduced by Law 12 of 1986, the transfer had a number of points of
similarity and difference  with the tax allowance.  Both were based on a
30-702 sharing formula,  that is partly by department and partly by
popuilation,  but in the latter case the national territories  were excluded.
Neither tax provided any incentive for increased fiscal effort by lower
levels  of government.  The main differences  were that under the sales tax
allowance  municipal and not departmental activities  were the main
beneficiaries and that the population basis for the allocation  was
18/ N.E. Slack and R.M. Bird, Op. cit.
19/ In 1983, the sales tax was expanded to a value-added tax (IVA).  Via
Decree 232 in that same year, 302 of IVA revenues  were allocated as
follows: 25% to departmental  municipalities via the 30-70% sharing
formula, 1.5% for the national territories to be invested in local
government, and 3.5% for the social security funds of departmental
governments.  In addition part of the revenues tL.at  were to have gone
to municipalities were diverted to departmental FERs in the following
proportions: 302 for municipalities of 100,000-500,000  population and
502 for those over 500,000.- 30 -
Table  8  The  Distribution  of Sales  Tax  Revenues.  1985-92
(As  Z of IVA  collection)
Recipient  19 85a  1 98 6b  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992
All  municipalitiesC  25.0  25.8  25.9  26.4  27.0  27.5  28.0  28.5
Small  municipalitiesd  0.4  1.8  3.8  6.0  9.0  12.5  16.8
National  territoriese  1.5  0.7  0.6  0.6  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5
Social  Securityf  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.8  3.8  3.8  4.0
IGAC8  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1
ESAPh  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1
Total:  30.0  30.5  32.0  34.5  37.5  41.0  45.k,  50.0
Notes:
a. As  set  out  in  Decree  232  of 1983  (with  the  distribution  in  part  based  on 1973  population).
b.  Thus  allocation  actually  only  takes  effect  only  as  of July  1,  for  the  first  six  months,
1985  formula  applies.
c.  Includes  Bogota,  and  after  mid-1986,  municipalities  in  national  territories.  Note  however,
that  302  of  allocation  to  cities  between  100,000  and  500,000  population  and  502  of
allocation  to  cities  over  500,000  in  fact  goes  directly  to  FERs.
d. To  be allocated  in  accordance  with  fiscal  effort  formula  among  municipalities  of less  than
100,000  inhabitants.
*. After  mid-1986,  this  amount  goes  directly  to  national  territories  for  their  own  use,
without  restriction.
f. This  share  goes  to the  sectional  social  security  funds  (including  those  in  the territories)
and  is  intended  mainly  to  cover  social  security  payments  for  teachers.
g.  Instituto  Geografica  Agustin  Coddazi. To  be used  for  revaluation  in  smaller  municipalities.
h.  Escuela  Superior  de  Administracion  Publica. To  commence  as of 1987.
Source: "IBRD  Colombia  - A Revie-  of Recent  Decentralization  Measures",  Washington,  D.C.;
April  6, 1987,  p. 36.
quickly adjusted from the census of 1964 to those of 1973 and then 1985.
Because of the size and elasticity of the sales tax, the transfer became an
important source of municipal finance.  It was the  most important transfer
to Colombian municipalities and, most particularly, to those cities other
than Bogota and the departmental capitals for  whom it was the equivalent of
twice the level of municipal tax collections in the late 1970s.  Because
there  were no incentives to raise local resources, there is some  evidence
that the sales tax transfer  mainly substituted for local resources.- 31 -
31.  Law 12 of 1986 is designed to bring about improvements in the
finances of smaller cities and brought major changes in the sales tax
transfer.20 Law 12 has three important  objectives:
o  To strengthen the smaller  municipalities, both by giving them more
resources and by encouraging their own fiscal efforts.
O  To transfer to  municipalities certain national responsibilities
equal in amount to the amolnt of additional revenues transferred.
O  To increase the efficiency of the local sector; by reducing the
number of agencies  working at the level and by increasing the capacity
of local institutions.
32.  The major changes introduced  by Law 12  were:  (a) the increase in
the proportion shared of the  value-added tax from 30Z to 50% by 1992 and
especially the share going to small cities (see  Table 8);21 (b) the
introduction  of a "tax effort" formula for small municipalities; (c) the
use of population as reflected in the 1985 census as the sole basis for
sharing (modified  by "effort" in small  municipalities)--i.e. the
elimination of the 30% share that formerly  was divided equally among
departments; (d)  the additional funds for municipalities in excess of
25.8Z (1986 share) to be spent on investments (including  maintenance, debt
service and investment in FFDU bonds); (e)  new shares for the Public
20/ The discussion of Law 12 (1986)--its  content and effects and the issues
it raises--closely follows IBRD Colombia - A Review of Recent
Decentralization Measures (Washington,  D.C.; April 6, 1987), pp. 33-46.
21/ Note that Luw 12  maintains the retention feature of the previous
allocation system in that for cities  with population of
100,000-500,000,  302 of their potential transfers  will be redirected
to department FERs while for cities over 500,000, the amount would be
50%.- 32 -
Administration Institute (ESAP)  and National Cadastre Agency (IGAC),
agencies  which provide training for local level officials and revised
estimates of property values respectively; (f) and a timetable for the
national government to reorganize and transfer functions toward the 1992
deadline.
33.  The full implementation  of Law 12  will have a major impact on the
finances of municipalities.  By 1992,  municipalities in the aggregate
will receive 852 more resources than they  would have under the old sharing
formula. 22 For small municipalities, the increase is due to an increase
in their share and to an assumed greater fiscal effort since, due to
relatively slow growth, they  would have lost revenues on a population
basis alone.  For larger cities, the increase is due mainly to their
increase in population share and to a lesser extent to the rising
proportion of the IVA (impuesto  al valor agregado or VAT) being shared.
These changes will have a major impact on the finances of municipalities.
The dependence of municipalities on transfers  will rise dramatically--for
all municipalities from 382 to 58% of current revenues and especially for
small  municipalities from 67 to 83% of current revenues. 23 Without these
transfers it is estimated that municipalities in general--and small
municipalities in particular--would not be able to finance their current
expenditures out of their own revenues.
34.  Law 12 represents a welcome attempt to transfer greater resources
to municipalities, give them incentives to raise their own resources (at
least for smaller municipalities), and initiate some measures to increase
22/ See IBRD (1987),  2D. cit, p. 39
23/  Ibid,  p. 40.- 33 -
municipal absorptive capacity.  As such, however, the Law raises a number
of issues about:
(a)  the form of the sharing formula for small municipalities;
(b)  the restriction of tax effort just to those municipalities; and
(c)  the speed with which municipal absorptive capacity can be
increased.
35.  First, the elimination of the 30% portion of IVA shared equally by
departments and the introduction  of a "fiscal effort" factor for small
municipalities are both improvements.  However, the formulas that have
been used raise questions.  The formulas suggested  by the Government and
by the World Bank account for fiscal effort adding a factor to the
population share  which reflects a community's efforts relative to average
efforts.  The Government's formula is:24
CAMi '_-  . CAT -ACi  - -Pi  r  Ri  Ri
Pop  i  EACi  Aci
and the World Bank's recommended reformulation is:25
CAMi -CAT  Pi  _  Pi  [ACi  +  Pi 1  [ti  ACi
[Pop  Pop  j  ACi  Pop  EACi  J
where CAT is total transfer to be divided among  .municipalities; CAHi is
the transfer received by the ith  municipality; P1 is its population and
Pop is the total population of small  municipalities; AC1 is the total
cadastral value (less  tax exempt properties) in the ith municipality and
24/ See  DNP Proveccion de la ParticiDacion de los Hunicipios en  la Cesion
del ImDuesto al Valor Aaretado (Bogota;  Septiembre 1988),  p. 6
25/ See  IBRD (1987),  Op. cit., p. 42.- 34 -
Ri is property taxes (plus  surcharges) collected and ti is the effective
tax rate in the ith municipality or its  property tax revenues divided by
its cadastral values and t is the average tax rate across ail small
muni ipalities.  As o.riginally  conceived the formula was to be applied
separately to each department, and so the relevant comparator group would
be all small municipalities in the same department.  The formulas intend
to say that the amount that any  municipality receives  will be larger, the
higher are its tax rates and the greater are its cadastral  values.26
However, both formulas are also flawed. in that  municipalities are
encouraged to increase the cadastral assessments only if their tax rates
exceed the department average; otherwise such an increase  would reduce the
amount of transfer received.  This flaw can be corrected by redefining the
formula to eliminate the direct connection between cadastral assessments
and the transfer received, thus;
i-.Mi  - CAT -Pi  [  t  + t*i 
.- op
where ti is actual property tax receipts in the ith district divided by the
cadastral values of the ith municipality that  would be obtained if
assessment practices in all small  municipalities were the same (t*  being
equivalently defined as the average for all relevant small  municipalities).
Thus defined, this cadastral  value is outside the control of the ith
municipality but it can always increase the transfer received by raising
26/ Both the formula contained in Law 12 (1986) and the Bank's proposed
revision leave open the question of  what to do  with municipalities
whose reduction in share because of poor fiscal effort exceeds their
population share.  The intention appears to be that such jurisdictions
would get zero and the amount to be shared  would be divided up among
the remaining qualifying jurisdictions.- 35 _
its tax rates or raising its cadastral assessment since either  would
incre.se its revenues relative to the equivalently assessed cadastral base. 27 28
36.  Secondly, the "fiscal effect" formula is too narrowly focussed both
as to the taxes covered and the types of municipalities.  By focusing on
property taxes, it not only fails to encourage the development of other tax
bases but may actually encourage tbe substitution of property taxes for
other types of taxes  with little overall gain in local resource
mobilization.  To  forestall this probletm,  consideration should be given to
including all municipal revenue sources in the formula, even  while
continuing to use cadastral  values as tne (actual  or potential) tax base.
Moreover the application of "fiscal  effort" to small  municipalities alone
is undoubtedly undesirable.  Large  municipalities (above 100,000
inhabitants)  bulk large in total local government finance and the lack of
an incentive for effort invites them to substitute  national resources for
local resources.
27/ By using uniform assessments (or uniform relations between assessed
values and market values) across different (small)  municipalities, no
municipality would stand to gain from undervaluing its property or lose
from increasing  assessed values.  In fact, communities  would only stand
to gain from increasing  assessments both because their owni  revenues
would rise as would the transfer received.  The recommended sharing
formula  would necessitate some agency--such as the Instituto Geografico
Agustin Codazzi (IGAC)--provide  information so that the uniform or
equivalent assessed value of property in each  municipality could be
calculated.
28/ Note that as they stand all three formulas take into account factors of
"need" (as represented by population share) and "fiscal  effort" (each
community's tax performance relative to some average performance) but
all ignore the question of "taxable capacity" (i.e. differential per
capita  tax  bases)  and  hence  make  no attempt  to compensate  for
differences  in  capacity. In  addition,  regardless  of  which  of these
sharing  formulas  were  used,  the  problem  would  remain  that  each
municipality  was to  be compared  with  other  municipalities  in the  same
department,  thus  raisin8  the  possibility  of unequal  treatment  of
municipalities across departments.  This potential anomaly in the
application of the formula  was corrected in 1987 and now small
municipalities are being compared nationwide.- 36 -
37.  Thirdly, Law 12 and its follow-up  Decree 77 (1987)  which identified
those public services to be transferred to local government, 29 reassigned
responsibilities among  various levels of government and presented
timetables for the alteration/liquidation  of a number of government
agencies, have mandated a major shift in responsibilities and in available
resources among levels of government.  At this stage it is not yet clear
whether local governments are well prepared to handle the additional
responsibilities, especially  within the short timeframe available.  To
date, there has been no thorough analysis of the capacity of local
government to deliver the additional services.  Nor have many jurisdictions
complied  with the requirement of Law 12 that annual reports be submitted on
the use of IVA resources.  Nor has there been a serious attempt to match
the cost of the activities transferred  with the additional resources being
made available by Law 12.  There is considerable skepticism at the local
level about the sufficiency of resources.  A number of steps appear
4esirable to assure that the added resources are put to good use.
Municipalities should be required to submit annual investment  plans as a
preconditioni  for receiving IVA transfers.  While such plans are likely to
be crude  at first  until  local  planning  capacity  can  be improved  and  better
coordination  between  planning  units  at all  levels  of government  can  be
achieved,  it  would  encourage  better  planning  and  at least  rudimentary
justification  for  projects  being  undertaken. In  addition,  to assure  local
29/  Among  the  public  services  to be transferred  to the  local  level  are:
provision  of drinking  water,  sanitation,  garbage  disposal;  management
of  markets  and  slaughter  houses;  construction,  operation  and
maintenance  of health  posts  and  centers  and  regional  hospitals;
construction  and  maintenance  of schools  and  athletic  facilities;
provision  of  agricultural  extension  and  technical  assistance;
construction  and  maintenance  of feeder  roads,  bridges,  and  river  ports;
extension  of  electricity  services;  construction  and  up graditLg  of low
income  shelters;  and  cofinancing  (with  central  agencies)  for  rural
development  projects.- 37 -
resources  are  put  to  good  use,  cofinancing  or  matching  local  counterpart
funds  for  projects  with largely  localized  benefits  undertaken  by national
agencies  should  be required. The  required  matching  rate  could  vary
according  to sector  (according  to the  priority  the  national  government
might  wish to assign  to the  activity)  and  according  to  the  fiscal  capacity
of the  local  government.  Such  matching  programs  would  help  to compensate
for  weak local  institutional  capacity  in some  areas,  give  the  national
government  a  means  by  which  to  encourage  investment  in  priorit  zeas,  and
provide  local  finance  for  national  activities.
B.  National  Government  Level  Earmarking
1. Coffee  Fund
38.  The  Fondo  Nacional  del  Cafe (FNC)  was created  in 1940  in response
to the  new "Quotas  Agreement"  of the  International  Coffee  Organization
which  called  upon  signatories  to establish  mechanisms  for  withholding
surpluses  above  quota  limits. Management  of the  Fund  is  by the  National
Federation  of Coffee  Growers,  a private  non-profit  association  representing
almost  all  coffee  producers. The  Federation  is responsible  for  the
domestic  and  external  marketing  of  Colombia's  coffee. Its  activities
include  technical  assistance  to the  industry,  enforcement  of  quality
control,  provision  of storage,  promotion  of  external  coffee  sales,
representation  of  Colombia  in the  International  Coffee  Organization,  and
management  of the  FNC. 30 The  Coffee  Fund  intervenes  in  markets,  promotas
30/  For  useful  discussions  of FNC  activities,  see  Contraloria  General  de la
Republica  El Fondo  Nacional  del  Cafe  - Evaluaci6n  Institutional  v
Financiera  (Bogota,  Colombia;  December,  1988);  R.M.  Bird,  Taxation  and
Development  - Lessons  from  the  Colombian  ExDerience  (Harvard  University
Press,  Cambridge;  1970)  Appendix  B on Coffee  Tax  Policy;  and  V. Thomas,
Linking  Macroeconomic  and  ARricultural  Policies  for  Adjustment  with
Growth  - The  Colombian  Experience  (Johns  Hopkins  University  Press;
1985),  Chapter  6 and  Appendix  F.- 38 -
stabilization objectives, and engages in activities to assist the growers
and promote economic and social  welfare in the coffee growing areas.  The
nature of its activities and its relationship  with government are spelled
out in ten-year contracts  with government, the latest of  which covering
1989-99,  was just signed in December 1988.
39.  A major objective of coffee policy is the stabilization of growers'
real incomes at levels consistent  with long-run equilibrium international
prices.  The major stabilization instruments--the  ad valorem export tax and
the retention quota--also generate important sources of income for the
Fund. 31 32  Of the 6.5% tax on the  value of coffee exports, 2.5% goes to
the central government general  budget and 4% to the Coffee Fund, the latter
thus representing an earmarked tax. 33 In line  with government policy, the
ad valorem tax share going to the central government  has beeii  falling--from
22% at the inception of the tax in 1967 to 8% in 1980 to 2.5. in 1983.  The
4% tax rate, 0,8Z (or 20%) of which is reallocated to Departmen: Growers
Committees to be used for economic and social projects in  the growing
areas, has been coinstant  since 1967.  The retention  quota is a fixed
31/ The major source of the FNC's current income is its own sales of coffee
in foreign and domestic  markets.  It also obtains income from the ad
valorem and retention taxes and  oiom  sales of intermediate inputs (e.g.
fertilizer at subsidized prices) and from financial and equity
investments.
32/ T-io  other instruments of stabilization  policy do not have such obvious
fiscal implications--the  domestic support price and the minimum
exchange surrender requirement.  The minimum guarantee pric- is set by
the government, in consultation  with the Federation, taking into
account such factors as production cost, inflation, the exchange rate,
trends in production and stock holdings, and international prices.  The
Federation stands ready to buy unlimited amounts of coffee at the
minimum price.  The minimum exchange surrender requirement is the
minimum amount of foreign exchange to be surrendered by exporters to
the Banco de la Republica for each bag of coffee exported and forms the
basis for the ad valorem tax.
33/ There is an additional min,  - tax--the "pasilla"--of  62 of the volume of
exports of inferior grades of coffee.- 39 -
proportional amount of coffee--in  volume or equivalent  value--which
exporters must give to the Coffee Fund for every 100 bags of coffee
exported.  The proportion is set  taking  into account the present and
expected volume and value of coffee exports, exchange rates, and export
taxes.  To finance an accumulation of stocks and to improve the Coffee
Fund's finances, the retention quota  was reised from 15% in 1981 to a peak
of 68% 1985-87 before being reduced to 35% in December 1987.  The retention
tax acts like a tax on exports and because its proceeds are directed to the
coffee fund it should be viewed as an earmarked tax.
40.  Table 9 shows the amount of revenues the Coffee Fund obtained from
its 4% share of the ad valorem export tax and the retention quota.34 The
former is usually listed in any accounting  of central government earmarked
taxes, but the latter is not.  Because of discounts and bonuses the Fund
gives on private exports and because a significant share of exports in any
year comes from the Coffee Fund itself, the retention figures in the table
are likely to exaggerate the net income accruing to the Fund.  Bearing in
mind, therefore, that these are upper bound figures, 35 they would represent
Table  9  Earmarked  Taxes  for  the  Coffee  Sector.  1980-1987
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987
Ad Valorem
Export  Tax  3,005.0  2,823.0  3,112.6  3,377.0  4,698.5  7,298.7  14,905.2  11,671.1
Retention  Quotas 31,116.2  9,596.9  23,531.2  29,262.1  61,742.0  81,607.4  174,143.8  194,199.4
In  Kind  31,098.2  9,588.8  23,510.5  29,146.5  61,539.9  80,821.1  172,567.8  n.a.
In  Value  18.0  8.1  20.7  115.6  202.1  786.3  1576.0  n.a.
Total  34,121.2  12,419.9  26,643.8  32,639.1  66,440.5  88,906.1  189,049.0  205,870.5
Source:  Statistical Appendix Table A7.
34/ For a morc complete picture of the Coffee Funds' revenues and
expenditures, see Statistical Appendix, Table A7.
35/ They are also an exaggeration of retenticn's contribution to earmarking
because at times the Coffee Fund has loaned substantial sums of money
to the central government.- 40 -
an amount  equivalent  on average  to over 45%  of total  national  government
earmarked  revenues  1980-87.
41.  The Fund  engages  in a number  of activities  beyond  its
stabilization  function. Through  the  Departmental  Growers  Committees,  it
channels  resources  to health,  education,  rural  electrification,  and
infrastructure  in  the coffee  growing  areas.  Investments  are  decided  upon
in  consultation  with the national  government. Whatever  assets  are  created
in this  process  are owned  by the  government  and  operated  and  maintained,
using  the government's  resources,  as part  of the  normal  public  system.
Through  loans  and  equity  investment,  the Fund  has interests  in a  wider
variety  of activities  beyond  the coffee  sector: 36 e.g. transportation
(Flota  Mercante  GranColombiana--the  largest  maritime  fleet),  sugar,  steel,
meat processing  and  banks,  insurance  companies,  savings/mortgage
corporations. In addition,  it  carries  out activities  directed  at
promoting  the  production  and  conpumption  of coffee-  two  of  which are
direct  subsidies  to the  domestic  consumption  of coffee  and  the  provision
of subsidized  inputs  (mainly  fertilizers)  to  coffee  growers.
42.  It is  clear  that  the  Fund's  activities  have taken  it far  beyond
the stabilization  objectives  envisaged  some  50  years  ago.  Movement  back
toward  stabilization  and  other  coffee-sector  related  activities  would be
desirable. The recently  signed  contract  with government  (covering
1989-1999)  is an important  attempt  to refocus  the  Fund's  activities  and  to
increase  the  government's  influence  on its  operations. The  outstanding
features  of that  agreement  are: (a)  the  Fund's  budget  is to  be approved  by
the  National  Coffee  Committee  (which  has as  many government  represent-
atives  as  industry  representatives)  and the  Minister  of Finance;  (b)  the
Fund's  different  activities  will be accounted  for  more explicitly
36/ For a useful  umm-ary  of  FNC's  holdings  see  Contraloria  General  de la
Republica,  op.cit.,  pp. 114-117.- 41 -
by the objectives they serve; (c) its investments  will be restricted to
those  which directly benefit the coffee areas and a liet of non-related
holdings and a schedule for their sale by a target date (end-1993)  will be
prepared; and (d) the  Minister of Finance  will exercise veto power over
commercial policies related to coffee.  These are important steps to
returning the use of public money toward legitimate  public sector
activities such as stabilization and economic and social  welfare projects
together  with trade association type functions (e.g. quality control,
export promotion).  One might still  wish to question the use of export
taxes to finance public investment in coffee areas.  While there is a
general feeling in Colombia that the  monies for such investments have been
utilized effectively, there is no reason to suppose that coffee taxes will
generate the right amount of economic and sociA.l  infrastructure in these
areas.  It will be important to  monitor such investments to see that they
don't result in overbuilding or a maldistribution of infrastructure
between regions.  Lastly, subsidies for the domestic consumption of coffee
remain a questionable use of public money and the provision of subsidized
fertilizer has been shown in many other cot.ntries  to lead to wasteful use.
Continued progress toward the elimination of both these subsidies would be
desirable.
2.  National  Highways  Fund (Gasoline  Tax)
43.  The  Fondo  Vial  Nacional  (FVN)  was  created  by Law  64 of 1967  in
response  to a sharp  decline  in  road  infrastructure  investment  due  to  a
fragmented  public  works  budget  and  lack  of continuity  in budget  resources.
Its  mandate  was to  provide  funding  for  the  planning,  construction,  and
maintenance  of the  nAtional  highways  and inland  waterways  networks. Its
expenditures  are  mainly  on construction/rehabilitation/maintenance  and- 42  -
debt servicing (see  Tables A7 and A8 in the statistical appendix).
Operational expenditures, such as payroll and other general expenses, are
financed by the  Ministry of Public Works and Transport which is
responsible for implementing the investment and maintenance program.
FVN's major sources of funds are earmarked taxes on gasoline (about 70% of
revenues) tolls and sales of services (10%),  budget transfers (about  6%)
and (mainly  foreign) borrowing (about  9%).  Under Law 64 of 1967, as
modified by Law 30 of 1982, FVN receives 75% of the earmarked tax on
petroleum automotive fuel  while 10%  goes to the National Fund for
Neighborhood Roads (Fondo  Nacional de Caminos Vecinales or FNCV), 10% for
the national railways (Ferrocarriles  Nacionales de Colombia or FNC), and
5% for the Corporacion Financiera de Transporte (CFT) to fund urban
transport operations.
44.  During the 1980s, expenditures on the construction and maintenance
of national highways have not expanded in real terms and hence have not
kept pace with the expansion of general economic activity (see  Table 10).
The failure of gasoline taxes to raise sufficient revenues and the
diversion of increasing amounts of FVN resources to debt service appear to
be the major reasons.  Article 2 of Law 30 (1982)  modified the gasoline
tax from a 5% rate based on the retail price to a specific amount
equivalent to Colombian $13.50 per gallon of regular motor gasoline and
diesel fuel (gasoline  for aircraft and marine diesel  were exempted).  The
amount of the tax is to be adjusted each time the gasoline price changes
by an amount  which takes into account the percentage change in the prices
of gasoline and diesel and the percentage change in the heavy construction
price index.  Prices and taxes have in fact been adjusted annually but not
enough to keep up with inflation generally and revenues from the gasoline
tax have been falling in real terms (see Table 10).  The rise of debt- 43  -
Table 10  Real Outlays in the Hithway Sector - Fondo Vial
(millione of Colombia $ in 1975 prices)
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987




Expenditures  3624.4  3975.1  2853.4  2415.6  2338.3  2657.8  2403.1  3179.2
Memorandum Item
Real Gasoline Tax
Revenue  4239.1  4386.5  4044.4  3260.7  3197.7  3156.1  3021.7  3243.3
Gasoline  Tax  in
current  prices)
(Col. $/gal.)  8.71  12.50  13.50  16.45  19.64  22.06  26.49  32.58
Gasoline Tax Adjusted
for Inflation (Col.
$/gal.  e 1975
prices)  2.90  3.29  2.93  2.97  2.94  2.61  2.44  2.41
Source:  Data from statistical  appendix Tables AS and A9 deflated by the GDP deflator.
service  (mainly  on external  debt)  has  been  a recent  phenomenon.  From
merely 0.7% of FVN's expenditures in 1980 it rose to 10.4% in 1986 and
17.40% in 1987 (see  Table A8 in statistical appendix).  While transfers
from the central government  budget have been rising, they have not been
sufficient to offset the squeeze from falling gasoline revenues and rising
debt service and FVN expenditures on construction and maintenance were
lower than in 1980 in all years but one (1981);  even a major expansion in
1987--financed  mainly by external borrowing--left expenditures some 12%
lower than in 1980.37
37/ See Table 10  where data is current prices have been converted to
constant (1975)  prices by use of the GDP deflator.  Similar results
would be obt.ined if the deflator for heavy construction activities
were used instead.- 44 -
45.  The general impression is that the resources of FVN are fairly  well
managed.  Projects are subject to feasibility  studies and,  while there is
room for improvement, there is no reason to suspect that a significant
proportion of projects fail to meet economic criteria.  The investment
program of FVN--and any significant changes during the year--are subject to
approval by National Planning Department and by Congress.  The amounts of
expenditures devoted to road maintenance and rehabilitation  appear to have
been appropriate.  The Ministry of Public Works and Transport has been
guilty in the past of starting up too many projects and spreading its
resources too thinly.  As a consequence, completions  have been delayed and
cost overruns and commitments fees on external loans  have consumed  more
resources than expected.  These problems are being corrected in the past
couple of years by conscious efforts to speed the completion of ongoing
projects and to delay the start up of major prcgrams.  Moreover, highway
officials are convinced that the existence of earmarked funds protects them
from the complexities of the budget process and allows them to engage in
long-term contracts  with the private sector that  would not otherwise be
possible.  However, FVN (and FNCV) have fallen  victim to the same problems
highway funds in  many LDCs have faced--the failure of the automatic tax
arrangements to generate the appropriate level of revenues to carry out the
long-term construction and maintenance program.  In the late 1970s, it
appeared that the gasoline tax  was generating too much resources; 3 9 in the
1980s, falling zeal gas taxes--and rising debt service--appear to be
leading to a shortage of resources.
46.  In principle, gasoline taxes are a legitimate application of the
benefit principle of taxation.  There is normally a  strong link between
38/ See  Bird-Wiesner Report, Op. ctt., p. 113.- 45 -
the  tax  base  and  service  received  from  the  highway  system  because  road
users  must  buy  gasoline  and  the  costs  they  impose  can  be captured  in the
higher  price  of gasoline  stemming  from  taxation. Gasoline  taxes,
therefore,  could  be used  in lieu  of direct  user  charges. While  it is
difficult  to  calibrate  taxes  paid  to the  exact  amount  of damage  done  by
different  types  of uses (trucks  causing  much  greater  damage  than  private
passenger  vehicles),  reasonable  approximations  can  be established  and  a
significant  proportion  of the  cost  of constructing  and  operating  the  system
recovered  from  the  users. In  Colombia,  however,  the  link  between  the
consumers  of road  services  and  road  expenditures  has  been  broken. Since
the  price  paid  by consumers  is  roughly  equivalent  to the  c.i.f.  import
price,  road  users  are  not  being  taxed. Instead,  it  is evident  that
Ecopetrol  (the  domestic  gasoline  producer)  is  being  taxed  since  the  price
it receives  is  lower  than  the  c.i.f.  prices  by an  amount  approximating  the
gasoline  tax. If earmarking  of  gasoline  taxes  for  highway  expenditures  is
to be retained  in  Colombia,  it is  the  consumer  who should  be taxed--i.e.,
retail  prices  should  exceed  c.i.f.  prices. Moreover,  it  would  be desirable
to set  gasoline  taxes  (and  other  road  user  taxes  such  as tolls,  licenses
and  registration  fees),  such  that  the  required  a:ghway  construction  and
maintenance  program  can  be carried  out.
3.  PROEXPO
47.  PROEXPO  is  one  of a three  part  set  of export  incentives  which  has
been  in  existence  for  more  than  twenty  years  and  which  includea  Plan
Vallejo,  which  provides  registered  exporters  with access  to duty  free
imports;  the  CERT system  which  provides  rebates  for  domestic  indirect  taxes
(and  tariffs  as  well for  unregistered  exporters);  and  PROEXPO  itself  which
provides  subsidized  credit  for  exports. PROEXPO  is a financial  institution- 46 -
with clear  links  to  the  central  bank (Banco  de la Republica). 39 It offers
33  distinct  lines  of credit  for:  pre-  and  post-shipment  financing;  long-
term  investment,  working  capital,  promotion  of  exports,  and  technical
assistance  for  quality  control. A relatively  minor  share  of PROEXPO's
portfolio  is  in equity  investments  (about  20%)  and  for  the  past  two  years
policy  has  been  to discourage  such  investments.  PROEXPO  does  not  raise
money  in  capital  markets  to  any  extent  but  instead  relies  on rollover  of
existing  loans  (60-70%),  interest  earnings  (7-10%)  and  earmarked  taxes
(15-20%)  to  provide  funding  for  its  loans  (see  Table  All in  statistical
appendix). The earmarked  tax  is its  share  of a general  18%  tax  on c.i.f.
imports  which is  divided  in the  following  way:  National  Treasury  - 10.4%;
PROEXPO  - 6%;  IFI  - 0.8%;  and  Caja  Agraria  - 0.8%.
48.  Overtime,  PROEXPO  has  reduced  the  extent  of the  subsidy  in  its
credit  lines,  but the  subsidies  still  remain  sizable. Most  of its  credit
carried  a 19%  rate  1980-83  and  22% 1984-86,  compared  to  commercial  bank
rates  which  averaged  44%.40 During  the  past  two  years,  PROEXPO  has  sought
to increase  its  financing  of fixed  investment  by offering  rates  of 18%  for
terms  up to 8 years  while  raising  the  rates  on  pre  and  post-shipment
finance  to about  35%. During  the  1980s,  PROEXPO  credit  has averaged  the
equivalent  of 5.6%  of  domestic  credit  outstanding  and  the  loans  made  each
39/  The  General  Manager  of the  Banco  de la  Republica  is  the  Director  of
PROEXPO,  which  has  two  executive  directors  in charge  of Export
Promotion  and  Financial  Operations.  PROEXPO's  employees  are  central
bank  officials  but  the  fund  has  a separate  salary  structure. PROEXPO's
Board  of Directors  consists  of:  Minister  of Economic  Development
(President);  Minister  of Foreign  Relations;  Director  of INCOMEX;
Manager  of Banco  de la  Republica;  and  three  private  sector
representatives  appointed  by the  President  of  Colombia.
40/  See  I.B.R.D.  Colombia  - Trade  Policy  Survey  (1988),  pp.  42-43.- 47 -
year relative to total minor exports (i.e.  non-coffee) have been a sharply
declining trend from 39Z in 1981 to 10% in 1986.
49.  PROEXPO is one of the earmarked funds covered by Law 55 (1985),  but
part of the intended reallocation appears to have been offset through
increases in resources that it has been able to obtain.  According to Law
55, 20% of PROEXPO's earmarked tax proceeds are to be reallocated to the
financing of the CERT (or  other financial incentives for exports) in 1985
and 1986 rising by 10% per year to a ceiling of 50% in 1989.  And transfers
have indeed taken place in line  with this schedule.  At the same time,
however, PROEXPO has received a major increase in resources through a rise
in its share of the tax on imports c.i.f., an expansion in the proportion
of imports covered by tariffs, and a surge in imports.  As a consequence,
the amount of earmarked resources--even  after subtracting out transfers
under Law 55 was no lower in real terms in 1986 than in 1985 and  was only
15% lower in 1987 than in 1985.
50.  The logic of financing PROEXPO  with an earmarked tax on imports is
highly questionable.  There is  no connection  between those  who must bear
the cost (consumers and producers using imported products) and those who
are obtaining the benefits (domestic  producers obtaining higher profits
and/or foreign consumers receiving cheaper goods).  Hence, shielded from
the budget process  where these allocations  would be evaluated against other
priorities and from capital markets where the ability of PROEXPO's loans to
cover its cost of raising funds and its administration costs  would be
considered, there is no rea&on to suppose that the amount of subsidized
loans is in any sense efficient or desirable from Colombia's point of view.
The realization thAt resources d  pend on total imports and infrequent
changes on the duty on imports c.i.f. rate allocated to PROEXPO (1.5%
1968-75, 5% 1975-86; 6%, 1986)  only enhances our suspicicn that it is- 48 -
unlikely that the appropriate level of resources is being provided for this
activity.  Moreover, while at first glance PROEXPO appears to be an attempt
to offset the bias against exports inherent in the protection given to
import substituting activities, it is not evident that this is so.  The
subsidies to exports in PROEXPO loans are made possible by taxes on imports
which in themselves  would discourage exports. 4 1 At best then, PROEXPO
loans and their financing  would encourage the production of traded goods at
the expense of non-traded goods.  But, since not all of PROEXPO's loans are
directly related to exports and since the subsidies to export vary sharply
across sectors,42 the offset to greater protection is incomplete  and
introduces distortions into economic activities.  The financing of PROEXPO
with earmarked taxes should,  therefore, be ended and the question of
subsidizing credit for exports--regardless  of source of finance--should  be
re-examined.
C.  Departmental Earmarking
51.  The principal sources of  departmental income are from earmarked
revenues.  Three of the  major revenue earners aze earmarked for health:
beer for the Sectional Health Services, SSS (with  a minor part for the
41/ There are two arguments  why the financing of PROEXPO may not be biased
against exports.  The first is that quantitative restrictions, not
tariffs, are the binding constraint and hence raising tariffs enables
the government to share in rents  without raising the level of
protection.  This argument's  validity is dissipating, however, as
Colombia dismantles its QR system, relying more heavily on tariffs for
protection.  The second argument is that the tariff rate has been set
independently of PROEXPO's requirements  and the government is merely
allowing PROEXPO to share in this revenue.  This reasoning is
questionable since it strengthens the suspicion that the funding of
PROEXPO is arbitrary and unrelated to legitimate  needs for export
financing and since the government  always has the option of lowering
the  tariff  if it  did  not  want these  funds  to go to  PROEXPO.
42/  See  IBRD,  Colombia  - Trade  Policy  Survey,  op.  cit.,  p. 44.- 49 -
National Fund for Neighborhood Roads); liquor for the SSS; and profits :-d
taxes from lotteries (and race course betting) which go mainly to the SSS
with a  minor portion going to schools for the blind and the National
Federation for the Blind.  A fourth major source of departmental revenue
--cigarette taxes--is also earmarked for Sectional Sports Commission, of
which 30%  must be passed on to the Colombian Institute of Youth and Sports
(COLDESPORTES)  which in turn is required to pass on 10% to Colombia
Institute of Culture (COLCULTURA).  The remaining sources of departmental
current revenues--mainly a small specific tax on gasoline, taxes on animal
slaughter, and taxes and fees on the ownership of automobiles--and a number
of non-tax revenues are quite small but because they have proven to be
somewhat  more elastic (or less  unelastic) than the earmarked sources, their
share in departmental revenues actually rose from 11% to 24% 1980-86.
52.  The type of tax (and lottery earnings) earmarking found at the
departmentai level has no rational basis whatever.  There is virtually no
link between taxpayers and the beneficiaries of government services
provided.  Hence, there is no reason to believe that tax revenues are
generating an appropriate amount of resources for the activities in
question.  Moreover, there is no reason to believe that the tying of
revenues to expenditures enables the government to raise more revenues
because taxpayers see the proceeds going for a worthy cause.  Taxes on
alcohol and tobacco raise considerable sums in  most countries regardless of
how the proceeds are used.  This leaves us with a final argument that the
bulk of the earmarking is for  worthy decentralized agencies (such  as SSS)
which are growing rapidly and are in need of transfers from both central
and departmental governments.  However much cuch transfers  may be needed,
the question is still open as to the appropriate level of resources for- 50 -
such activities and the division of responsibilities of the central and
departmental governments.  The answer is not in the arbitrary earmarking of
such taxes which apparently  has not been sufficient to prevent the
virtually complete substitution  of national for departmental resources, but
in the reform of the sharing formula for the tax allowance to take account
of departmental  needs and to induce greater local fiscal efforts. 43
D.  MuniciDal Level Earmarking
53.  The major sources of revenue for Colombia's municipalities are the
property tax, the industry and commerce tax, and transfers from higher
levels of government (esp.  the central government).  Other taxes (e.g.  on
billboards, vehicles, gambling, and public sFectacles) generate relatively
minor amounts of revenues.  Of these sources, the major contribution to
municipal level earmarking is the valorization tax, a betterment tax levied
on real propertv that has benefitted from the construction of local public
works.44
54.  Valorization represents one of the purest forms of earmarking.
This purity results from several characteristics:
o  the fact that taxpayers and beneficiaries overlap to a
substantial degree;
o  the use of benefit-cost type considerations in making
investment decisions ("appraisal"  or "analysis"  might be too
43/ See our discussion of the "tax allowance" in  para. 29.
44/ For an evaluation of the practice of valorization in Colombia see
W.G. Rhoads and R.M. Bird. "Financing  Urbanization by Benefit Taxation"
Land Economics 43 (November 1967),  pp. 403-12; IBRD Valorization
CharQes as a Method for Financing Urban Public Works: The Example of
Bogota. Colombia Staff Working Paper No. 254 (March 1977); and
International Tax Program, Intergovernmental  Finance in Colombia: Final
Report of the Mission on Intergovernmental  Finance (The  Law School of
Harvard University; Cambridge, 1984),  pp. 280-282.- 51  -
strong a  word) and the conscious and conscientious attempt to
allocate tax assessments proportionally according to how
people benefit from the project; and
o  the strong link between valorization revenues and
expenditures (i.e. no supplements from or diversions to
general fund financing, at least in principle).
In addition,  valorization appears to reverse the usual sequence of
earmarking whereby available revenues drive expenditure levels: instead,
the identification of desirable projects, often within the scope of
prepared investment programs, appears to call forth efforts to raise
financing from prospective beneficiaries.
55.  Valorization--as practiced in Colombia--is a system  by which the
costs of public investments are apportioned and recovered according to the
distribution of the benefits received.  While practice has evolved over
time, Colombian municipalities, as well as some specialized agencies, have
been given the right to recover costs and considerable flexibility in
determining how to measure and allocate benefits.  Over time the scope of
valorization has been extended to include street construction, local
paving, parking facilities, urban development, and what are called "green
spaces" and "zones of historical interest".
56.  Upon a project's selection,  a "zone of influence" is demarcated,
the area over which benefits are expected to be felt.  Benefits are
estimated--as the total resulting rise of site values--and allocated across
the properties within the zone according to formulas  which take into
account a number of characteristics such as size, shape, topography,
frontage, distance from project, and a number of economic factors.  This
allocation then determines how the project costs are allocated across
properties.  Costs eligible for inclusion  are: (a) cost of land; (b) cost- 52 -
of construction; (c) cost of administration,  estimated at 20% of (a); (d)
contingencies, estimated at 5-10% of (a) plus (b); (e) interest on the
value of (a) and (b) during the construction  period; and (f)  honoraria for
representatives.
57.  In principle, there is notning to stop authorities from attempting
to recapture some or all of the project (net)  benefits, but in practice
only full recovery of the costs lit  ted above is sought.  Care in selection
is exercised to make sure that projects yield benefits in excess of costs;
in practice the rapid development of most cities plus inflation has left a
sizable margin for error.  In addition, consideration is given to problems
that the ;oor or persons with few liquid assets  might have in paying the
tax.  Low income persons can be exempted altogether and others are allowed
to stretch out the valorization tax payments over several years if
otherwise it  would absorb a significant fraction of their annual income.
58.  The valorization tax as practiced obviously  has a number of
desirable features--the  benefit connection; the efforts to select
economically desirable projects, and the flexibility  with which it has been
adopted in differing circumstances.  As a tax on the unimproved value of
land, the tax would have no adverse incentive  effects, and in fact the
combination of the tax and the improvement serve to raise income and
increase tht potential profitability of investments  which should have a
desirable incentive effect.
59.  On the other hand, valorization does have some drawbacks,
primarily centered around collections  problems.45 Firse, quite aside from
45/ See World Bank, World Development ReRort 1988 (Oxford  University Press;
June 1988),  p. 160.- 53 -
the fact that authorities attempt to recover only project costs,
collections fall far short of 100Z.46  The reasons appear to be cost
overruns, generous exemptions (e.g.  the Catholic Church, charitable
institutions,  and public enterprises), and generous exceptions/payment
schedules given to the poor and those  with liquidity problems.  Problems
have particularly arisen when projects have been designed to improve
conditions in low income areas.  Second, the concept of the "zone of
influence" has its limitations:  in a number of cases, a sizable fraction
of beneficiaries fall outside the zone, and this has led to collection
problems because persons within the zone  were reluctant to pick up the
added burden.  It is also hard to implement  with a number of projects
simultaneously affecting a number of overlapping zones.  Lastly,
valorization revenues have proven to be quite unstable in part because of
collection problems and in part due to administrative  deficiencies in
planning and implementing  projects; thus revenue growth seems to be
characterized by periods of stagnation followed  by sizable increases.
60.  Despite its imperfections,  valorization deserves a favorable
rating.  Its popularity and its ability to raise revenues  would justify its
continuation and extension into cities  which have not taken full advantage
of it.  Its  weaknesses could be reduced by cutting back on exemptions and
the introduction of interest  payments and penalties on arrears (the former
was introduced in 1981).  Further,  where subsidization  of low income groups
is a key project objective, the naed for trar3fers should be made explicit
and financed from general budget revenues.
46/ Apparently this has been the experience  with betterment taxes around
the  world.- 54 -
E.  Payroll  Taxes
61.  Payroll taxes in Colombia are earmarked to provide financing for
two broad sets of activities--social  welfare type activities and
traditional social security.  Included in the former are programs of
technical skills and labor training (Servicio  Nacional Aprendizaje or
SENA), programs of preschool education and nutrition for children and
family  protection (Instituto  Colombiano Bienestar Familiar or ICBF) and
family allowances and various private sector activities (Cajas  de
Compensacion Familiar).  Included in the latter are a variety of programs
for pensions, health-maternity care, and occupational risk covering
employees in the private and public sectors.  These are financed through
payroll taxes and transfers from the government budget (the latter are
especially needed to cover the deficits of the  various public sector social
security programs).  Table 11 shows the contribution of employees and
employers (as I of  wages) for the  various programs.  Several features of
the contribution system stand out.  The range of contribution is large,
being quite high in the private sector and lower in the public sector,
especially in the programs for the  military and police.  The combined
employer/employee contribution of 15-20% for social security is already
quite high--seventh highest in Latin America in 1986--and  when the 9% tax
is added to cover Cajas de Compensacion (4%),  SENA (2%) and ICEF (3%),
total payroll taxes are adding 24-29% to the cost of Colombian labor.
1.  Funds for Social Welfare Objectives
62.  ICBF is a public agency responsible for matters pertaining to
nutrition and family  welfare.  Its program covers such activities as
foodprograms for children, assistance to families and children  with legal
problems, aid for orphans and children  with behavioral problems, and- 55 -
Table 11  Legal Contributions to Social Security by Program.
Source and Fund in Colombia: 1988
(as a percentage of wages)
Fund/  Active
Program  Insured (a)  Employer  State  Total
ISS (private sector)
Pensions  2.17  4.33  d  r.5
Health-Maternity  2.33/4.0 (b)  4.67/8.0 (b)  7.0/12.0 (b)
Occupational Risks  0  1.5 (c)  1.5
TOTAL  4.5/6.17  10.5/13.83  15.0/20.0
CAJANAL (public sector)
Pensions (e)  0  3.0  f  3.0
Health-Maternity  5.0  5.0  10.0
TOTAL  5.0  8.0  13.0
CAPRESUB/CAPRECOM
(public sector)
Pensions (e)  0  g  g
Health-Maternity  5.0  g  g  5.0
TOTAL  5.0  5.0
MILITARY
Pensions (e)  8.0  h  h  8.0
Health-Maternity  0  i  i  0
TOTAL  8.0  8.0
POLICE
Pensions  5.0  h  h  5.0
Health-Maternity  0  i  i  0
TOTAL  5.0  5.0
OTHER PAYROLL TAXES  0  9.0 (j)  0  9.0
(a)  In ISS, the voluntarily insured self-employed pays a percentage over income
equivalent to the combined percentage paid by the salaried insured and his employer.
(b)  Among those covered by family health program.
(c)  Avcrage premium; the premium should  vary from 0.28 to 72 according to risk but
the classification of risks is not yet in effect.
(d)  Initially the state had to contribute but never actually did and such
obligation was abolished in 1971.
(e)  There is no distinction between treatment of comon  and occupational risks and
the contribution to pension and health cover such risks.  In any case the employer
is considered directly responsible.
(f)  The state is responsible for absorbing most of the resulting deficit.
(g)  The employer (state) pays the rest.
(h)  The state pays all the resulting deficit.
(i)  The employer (state) pays all costs.
(j)  4% goes for Family Allowances (Cajas  de Compensacion), 22 for SENA, and 32
for ICBF.
Source:  Current Legislation.- 56 -
special projects for Indian minorities.47 In particular, its traditional
program (CAIP)  of daycare and supplemental feeding for children under 6
years involved supervised programs in  well-equipped day centers  with
trained personnel.  The program suffered from high administrative costs,
lack of targeting for the poorest, and lack of access.  To increase
replicability, IBCF launched a new "programa de hogares de bienestar
familiar" (HBI)  which involves  nutritional support, daycare facilities run
in the homes of volunteer mothers who are provided training and loans for
home upgrading, and the targeting of the poor through the location of the
facilities.48 The "hogares" program is supposed to expand from 45% to
85% of ICBF's budget by 1990 and its coverage from 400,000 to 1.5 million
children by 1992.  The increased resources to pay for this expansion is to
ccme from an increase in the payroll tax for ICBF from 2% and 3% and from
foreign borrowing.  Law 89/1989, approving that increase, was recently
passed.  Quite apart from unfavorable employment effect (see  below), this
is a questionable use of earmarked resources.  There is no connection
between the beneficiaries and the payors of the payroll tax.  There is
therefore no assurance that the amount of taxes generated are appropriate
for the activities involved.  If the "hogares program" is justified--and it
appears to have many attractive features--its redistributional intentions
should be financed from general revenues  where the matching of needs and
resources can be more continually assessed.
47/ See statistical appendix Table A14.
48/  ICBF  was one  of the  agencies  called  upon  to reallocate  earmarked
services  to  other  activities  in the  health  sector  under  Law  55 (1985)
and  actually  reallocated  about  8%  of its  1986  and  1987  budgets  to
children's  hospitals,  vaccinations,  and  malaria  control. From 1988,
the  reallocations  that  would  have  been  required  under  Law  55  will be
directed  to the  "hogares"  program.- 57 -
63.  SENA is a public sector agency responsible for the training of
various labor skills.  It has a decentralized structure to better enable it
to tailor its programs to local labor  market conditions.  Financed from a
payroll tax (2%  per annum on the payroll of public, private, and mixed
enterprises and 0.5: per annum on all government departments at the
national, department and municipal levels)  which has provided about 80% of
its resources in the 1980s, it at first confined the bulk of its training
activities to the needs of the entities paying the payroll tax. 49 However,
it has gradually expanded into construction, agriculture, and self-
employment areas, areas  which are only thinly covered by the payroll tax.
This process has been accelerated by Law 55 which has moved SENA into
broader areas of education--agricultural  research and extension, artisans
and handicrafts, rural development and rehabilitation  projects in guerilla
infested areas.  At first, SENA would appear to have a benefit rationale in
that employers obtain trained workers, but at best the link is not strong
since employers have no options about  whether or not to pay the payroll tax
or how much to pay and hence there is no reason to suppose that the payroll
tax generates the right amount of resources for training.  The likelihood
grows less with SENA expanding into activities that are more remote from
those that pay payroll taxes.  There are a number of indications that the
amount of resources going to SENA has been excessive:  its training
facilities are operating substantially below capacity; its agriculture
49/ The use of payroll taxes to finance training is  popular among Latin
American and Caribbean countries, particularly in the lower-middle per
capita income bracket (US$401-1635  GNP per capita).  These countries
charge payroll tax rates of 0.05-3.0% per year; among them only Jamaica
and  Venezuela have rates as high or higher than Colombia.  See J.
Whall y and A. Ziderman "Payroll  Taxes for Financing Training in
Developing Countries" (World  Bank, Policy, Planning, and Research
Working Paper No. 141;  January 1989).- 58 -
centers have been overbuilt; and it has been unable to utilize its budget
in most years in the 1980s. 50 Thus, it  would be desirable to cut SENA off
from automatic sources of financing and force it to compete for budgetary
resources  with other governmental departments and agencies.
64.  The Family Compensation Funds (Cajas  de Compensacion Familiar) are
private non-profit institutions, relying heavily on a 42 payroll tax for
financing.  The bulk of the monies are supposed to be paid out as "family
subsidies" to  workers in participating firms and the remainder is to be
used for various social programs directed at assisting the same group of
workers.  There are several questionable aspects of Caja activities.  Their
coverage is very narrow, reaching only about one-fifth of the employed
population.  While cash and in-kind allowances  have been paid out, a large
proportion of resources have gone into investment--e.g.  supermarkets,
theaters, and recreational facilities--which  are luxurious and beyond the
reach of ordinary workers.  The use of public monies for luxury investments
is quite simply undesirable and the use of an earmarked tax for this
purpose is again questionable.  The Cajas should be cut off from earmarked
taxes and forced to rely on their own resources.
2.  Social Security
65.  The social security system in Colombia consists of the Institute
of Social Insurance (ISS)  covering the  private sector and almost two
50/ This is not to argue that SENA's investments generally have not had
positive payoffs, but rather that at the margin there may have
excessive investments and that some of the movement away from modern
sector activities  may have been of questionable  value.  A recent study
by Jimenez and Kugler found that the rate of return to SENA's
investments  was 142 and that the payoffs were higher the greater were
worker's formal schooling or previous  work experience.  See E. Jimenez
and B. Kugler, An Economic Evaluation of a National Job Training
System:  Colombia's Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje (SENA); IBRD
Education and Training Series Report No. EDT 24 (April 1986).- 59  -
hundred funds covering civil servants at all levels and employees of public
decentralized agencies.  Although not commonly thought of in this fashion,
the payroll taxes that fund these various private and public funds
represent earmarked taxes in that they are the result of a contractual
obligation to pay pension, death and medical benefits and there is no
alternative use to which these monies may be put (except financial
investments toward the future payment of these obligations).  To the extent
that the funds are being run on an actuarially sound basis--i.e. that
premiums charged (payroll  taxes) plus interest accumulations are sufficient
to cover the expected payments to beneficiaries  based on age distribution,
mortality, and morbidity characteristics of population, payroll taxes  would
be a good indication of the trend in obligations of these funds.
Differentials between payments and premiums (payroll taxes) in any year
could be regarded as temporary deviations.  However, there are a number of
reasons that this is not the case in Colombia.  Firstly, a number of funds
rely explicitly on the government budget for funding (the tax on the
employee is small and there is no tax on the employer forcing continued
reliance on general budget financing).  Second a number of public
funds--most  notably CAJANAL which covers the majority of civil servants, at
least at the national level--have been running continuous deficits.  The
public programs--most importantly CAJANAL--have no actuarial base and no
financing program other than an ad hoc and open ended reliance on the
budget.  Thirdly, even in ISS,  which has run surpluses in all years but one
in the 1980s, premiums have not been increased in line  with actuarial needs
and pension funds have been depleted  by transfers to cover the costs of
medical programs.  For these reasons,  payroll taxes are an understatement
of present as well as potential future obligations the Government of- 60 -
Colombia may face.  Nonetheless payroll tax revenues for social security
are the appropriate indicator of their contribution to total earmarking.
They represented 18%  of total earmarking at all levels of government in
1980 and 19% in 1985 (see  Table 7).
3.  Emvloyment Effects of Payroll Taxes
66.  Questions of employment and poverty in Colombia appear to be
intimately related to formal sector  wage determination.  According to two
recent reports--by the Employment Mission (Chenery  Report) and the World
Bank, the Colombian labor  market has a number of prominent characteristics:
o  Employment is sensitive to changes in real  wages both in the short
and long-runs (i.e.  higher wages induce substitution of capital for
labor and also undermine the profitability of investment).
O  Employment is provided by formal and informal sectors, with the
latter accounting for about 70% of urban employment.
O  Wage differentials between the formal and informal sector can
partly be explained by skill mix differences but are greater than can
be explained by this factor alone, and
o  Poverty appears to be associated  with employment at low  wages in
the informal sector rather than unemployment (i.e. the payoffs to job
search for formal sector employment are high and many of the unemployed
appear to be financed by their families  or from savings).
O  Real wage growth for formal sector  workers--and especially the
non-wage component of compensation--appears  to be quite independent of
supply/demand factors.51
51/ See El Problema Laboral Colombiano: Diafnostico. Perspectivas v
Politicas -Informe Final de la  Mision de EmDleo (Economia  Colombiano -
Revista de la Contraloria General de la Republica: Agosto - Septiembre
de 1986) and IBRD Colombia - Country Economic Memorandum (October 15,
1987), Ch. III.- 61 -
67.  Since  the  mid-1970s,  total  labor  compensation  in  Colombia  has
risen  by more than  50Z in  real  terms--a  large  increase  both absolutely  and
relative  to the  cost  of  capital  which  has  scarcely  changed. Non-wage
compensation  (e.g.,  leave  arrangements,  dismissal  payments,  and  payroll
taxes)  has  been rising  faster  than  wage components.  As a consequence
mainly  of rising  real  wages  and  slower  real  growth  in  the 1980s,  the  open
unemployment  rate  has  risen  to 12-14%  (as  compared  with the  1958-79  average
rate  of  9.5%)  and  the  gap  between  formal  and  informal  sector  wages  has
widened  from  672  to 73%. Urban  poverty,  which  has  been shown  to  be more  a
question  of  employment  in low  productivity  jobs  in the  informal  sector
rather  than  open  employment,  is likely  to have  increased  in  the  process.
68.  The adverse  effects  of  payroll  taxes  on employment  are  an
important  consideration.  Both  because  of the  relatively  high  unemployment
rate  and  because  future  increases  in  payroll  taxes  may  become  necessary  to
put  the  social  security  system  on a sound  financial  and/or  actuarial  basis,
some  present  reduction  in  the  number  of activities  financed  by payroll
taxes  would  appear  to  be desirable. Payroll  taxes  have  unfavorable  effects
on  employment  by raising  the  cost  of labor,  penalizing  labor  intensive
sectors  and  making  it  economic  to substitute  machinery  for  labor. The
effects  on employment  will  be greater  the  higher  is  the  tax,  the  greater  is
labor's  share  in the  cost  of factors  of production,  and  the  greater  is  the
elasticity  of -. bstitution.  Two  recent  studies  enable  us to  get  some  idea
of the  amount  of employment  that  would  be generated  by reducing  payroll
taxes. In a study  prepared  for  the  Chenery  employment  mission,  Gom6z
Buendia  and  Cifuentes  projected  that  eliminating  the  payroll  taxes
supporting  SENA,  ICBEF  and  the  Cajas  de Compensacion  would  add  about  33,000
or the  equivalent  of about  0.5%  of the  urban  labor  force  to  total  urban- 62 -
employment.  Using estimates from the World Bank's later study of the
demand and supply of labor in Colombia's formal and informal sectors
suggests that the addition could be in the order of 70-75,000 jobs.  The
reduction of 0.5-1.1 percentage points on a 13% unemployment rate implied
by these studies is not trivial and suggests that finding different ways of
financing these activities  merits serious consideration. 52
V.  SUMMARY  AND RECOMMENDATIONS
69.  Over the past two decades, earmarking in Colombia has trended
upward and the sources of earmarking have become more varied.  The rise in
overall earmarking (in the "traditional"  sense) from 21% to about 35% of
revenues at all levels of government is the product of a substantial rise
in national government revenues earmarked from 11% to 28% and falling
proportions of revenues earmarked at the departmental and municipal levels
from 94% to 77% and 30% to about 20% respectively.  During this  period the
share of the national government in  earmarking at all levels rose from
under one half to over three quarters.  In 1970, departmental taxes on
alcohol/tobacco/gambling  were the largest source of earmarking followed by
the coffee export tax and gasoline tax at the naticnal level and the
valorization tax at the municipal level.  During the past two aecades,
revenue sharing (the tax allowance and sales tax transfer), import duties
for PROEXPO (et.  al.),  and,  to  a lesser extent, a number of new minor funds
have  increased  the  variety  of earmarking.
52/ See  H. Gom6z  Buendia and A. Cifuentes Noyes "Seguridad  Social Y Empleo"
in El Problema Laboral Colombiano, Tomo 2, J. Antonio Ocampo y M.
Ramirez (eds.), (Servicio  Nacional de Aprendizaje, Departmento Nacional
de Planeacion, Contraloria General de la Republica; Bogota, 1987),  pp.
115-139; and IBRD op. cit., Annex 3.- 63 -
70.  Concentration  on traditional  sources  of earmarking,  however,
understates  the  extent  to  which  government  monies  are  tied  up.
"Non-traditional"  sources--public  enterprises  net  operating  profits  and
payroll  taxes  for  social  security  and  SENA/ICBF  also  represent  earmarking
in  that  they  are  public  incomes  which  cannot  be used  flexibly  for  whatever
purposes  the  government  might  deem  necessary. Including  non-traditional
sources  raises  the  share  of earmarking  in total  public  incomes  to  about  55Z
today. About  971  of  earmarking  comes  from  just  eight  sources: public
enterprise  profits  (27X);  payroll  taxes  for  social  security  and  SENA/ICBF
(24x);  revenue  sharing  (201);  departmental  alcohol/tobacco/  gambling  taxes
(111);  the  gasoline  tax (7%);  import  duties  for  PROEXPO  et.  al. (4x);  and
the  ad  valorem  coffee  export  tax  and  municipal  valorization  tax (21  each).
The  remainder  comes  from  about  20 relatively  minor  sources  (e.g.  tourism,
cinema,  coal),  no one  of  which  contributes  as  much as  one  percent  to the
total.
71.  The  key  measures  taken  by the  government  in the  1980s  to reduce
the  extent  of earmarking  are  Law 55  of 1986  and  the  recently  passed  Organic
Law  of the  Budget  of 1988. The  former  is an  attempt  to reallocate
specified  proportions  of earmarked  money  to different  activities  in the
same  field. Because  of this  limitation,  a significant  increase  in
flexibility  in  the  use of  earmarked  monies  was  not  to be expected  and  in
practice  Law  55 activities  have  mostly  been  carried  out  by the  original
earmarking  recipient  agencies  themselves  because  they  were  best  qualified
to carry  out  the  activity  or because  changing  government  priorities  meant
that  reallocations  should  not  take  place  (as  for  example  with ICBF's
"hogares  program"). Thus,  Law  55 has  increased  the  variety  of activities
that  can  be financed  with earmarked  money,  but  has  not significantly- 64 -
increased  the  flexibility  of the  budget. The  new  Organic  Law  is likely  to
impact  on earmarking  both  directly  ard  indirectly.  It  prohibits  the
creation  of new  earmarked  funds  from  existing  sources  of revenue  and  it
also  states  that  the  operating  profits  of public  enterprises  belong  to  the
central  budget  until  (or  unless)  the  enterprise  justifies  their  use  with  an
appropriate  investment  program. The  latter  should  help  to foster  better
medium-term  enterprise  planning  and  introduce  some  flexibility  into  the
major  source  of earmarking.  In addition,  by greatly  restricting  the  number
of  mini  budgets  within  one  year,  the  new  Organic  Law  would  sharply  reduce
variance  between  original  and  final  budgets,  greatly  reducing  uncertainty
about  allocations  each  year.  If cumbersome  budget  procedures  were  also
reduced,  these  reforms  of  the  budgetary  process  could  substantially  reduce
the  pressure  for  earmarking.  Thus  despite  the  New  Organic  Law, further
measures  are likely  to  be necessary  to improve  budgetary  processes.
72.  Earmarking  in Colombia  is too  complex  to allow  blanket
recommendations  for  reform. Instead  we content  ourselves  with  piecemeal
suggestions  based  on assessments  of  whether  the  automatic  funding
arrangements  involved  in  each  case  are  likely  in  principle  to  bring  about
desirable  results  and  whether  they  are  working  in  practice. Our  assessment
in each  case involves  considerations  of  whether  there  is a  substantial
overlap  between  beneficiaries  and  tax/price  payers,  whether  the  tax/price
mechanism  appears  to generating  an appropriate  level  of resouirces,  and
whether  these  resources  are  being  utilized  effectively  for  the  purposes
intended. With these  considerations  in  mind,  there  are  five  broad
recommendations  some  of  which  will be elaborated  upon  in subsequent
paragraphs. If recommendations  (a)-(c)  below  were to be implemented  in
full,  approximately  one  quarter  of earmarking  would  be eliminated  and- 65 -
greater  flexibility  in  use  of resources  imparted  to an additional  one
quarter. The recommendations  are:
a.  There  are  a number  of  earmarking  arrangements  which  have  no
strong  benefit  rationale  and  which  are  prime  candidates  for
elimination;  i.e.  those  for  PROEXPO  (plus  IFI  and  Caja  Agraria);
SENA/ICBF/Cajas  de  Compensacion;  and  the  departmental  taxes  on
alcohol/tobacco/gambling  for  health,  welfare,  and  sports.
b.  Further  potential  candidates  for  elimination  should  be
sought  in the  large  number  of  very  small  funds  which  ma 1le up
about  31 of total  earmarking  (see  Statisticv  Appendix  Table  A2,
esp.,  the  categories  "Special  Funds",  "Cont butions  and
Participations",  and "Other"  at the  national  level). While  this
Report  has  not  had  the  time  to  review  thise  cases,  only  a small
number  (e.g.  the  taxes  on tourism,  cinema  tickets,  coal)  appear
to be  benefit  related  and,  in  all  cases,  questions  should  be
raised  about  whether  appropriate  levels  of funds  are  being
raised  and  whether  the  activities  being  financed  are indeed  a
desirable use of public funds.
c.  Those  parts  of the  new  Organic  Law  of tha  Budget  pertaining
to earmarking--namely, the limitations on mini-budgets, the
prohibition  of  new  earmarking  from  existing  revenue  sources,  and
the  claim  of the  central  budget  on public  enterprises'  operating
surpluses--should  be implemented  expeditiously.
d.  Existing  revenue  sharing  arrangements  between  the  central
government  and  the  department  or  municipalities  need to  be
strengthened  since  they  are  an important  part  of the
decentralization  effort.- 66 -
e.  There are a number of earmarking cases  which follow the
benefit principle quite closely (e.g.  coffee fund, gasoline tax,
and the  municipal valorization tax) and  which--with some
adjustments--could  suitably be continued.
73.  EArmarking arrangements for PROEXPO are a prime candidate for
elim.'.nation.  There is little connection  between those  who pay the import
duties and those  who bene.it (exporters  or foreign consumers); the
arbitrary level of the duty makes it  problematic whether an appropriate
amount of export financing is being provided; and the differential credit
subsidies across sectors  has introduced an additional distortion into the
allocation of  esources.  Payroll taxes for SENA/ICBF/Cajas de Compensacion
Familiar are also questionable. 53 The benefit connectico.  is virtually
absent in the case of ICBF and is not strong in the cases of the Cajas or
SENA  which have ventured into activities  which have little impact on the
payors of payroll taxes.  The result is that any rate cf payroll tax  would
end up being arbitrary and there is no assurance that the automatic funding
arrangements that earmarking entails are generating an appropriate level of
resources.  In addition, Colombia's payroll taxes (including those for
social security) are at the upper end of the spectrum among Latin Americ n
countries and add 24-29Z to the cost of labor.  Eliminating the pavroll
taxes for non-social security purposes  would lower labor costs and would
likely take 0.5-1.0 percentage points off the unemployment rate.  Lastly,
on the same grounds as above, the earmarking of departmental taxes on
beer/alcohol/tobacco/gambling for  welfare, health and sports has no
53/ The recommendation on ths payroll tax is conststent with that of the
Chenery employment mission.  See op. cit., p. 123.- 67 -
rational basis; such arrangements should be terminated and these activities
made to rely on general budget resources.
74.  The tax allowance and sales tax transfer--neither of which existed
20 years ago--have played important roles in the government's effort to
decentralize, the former for che  departments and the latter (mainly) for
municipalities.  The government is committed to continue in this direction
and our recommendations  here are intended to assist in this process.
First, certain anomalies in the sharing formulas ought to be corrected, in
particular the undue favoritism to small iurisdictions offered by the
non-population part of the tax allowance and disincentive to increase
cadastral  values contained in the present sales tax transfer.  Second, all
revenue sharing formulas ought to contain incentives for greater local
resource mobilization (as the formula for small  municipalities presently
does) to prevent national resources from substituting for local resources
and encourage greater efforts in priority areas.  And lastly, it is
essential that efforts be intensified to ensure that municipalities-
-especially small ones--have the capacity to utilize additional resources
effectively.
75.  Even for those earmarking cases  where the benefit principle seems
to fit and  where price tax arrangements offer the possibility of generating
an appropriate level of resources for the sector; a number of improvements
are necessary.  The coffee fund.  which has strayed into a number of
ao.tivities  beyond its mandate of income stabilization and assistance to
coffee growing areas, needs increased government surveillance.  The new
coffee contract 1989-1999  makes this possible, but very determined
government efforts will be needed to ensure that activities are refocussed
back toward the original  mandate.  As for earmarking in highways, it- 68 -
appears that it is the producer of gasoline (Ecopetrol)  and not consumer
who is paying the gasoline tax.  Earmarking is only justified  where the
benefit principle applies and consumers face a retail price that is above
the import c.i.f. price.  In addition,  while gasoline prices and taxes have
been adjusted annually, they still have not kept pace with inflation and
the amount of resources devoted to maintenance and construction has been
failing in real terms.  If earmarking for highways is to continue, gasoline
prices/taxes (and tolls, license, and registraticn fees) should be set that
they can cover an appropriate expenditure  program and debt service for the
sector.  Lastly, municipal level  valorization taxes represent a quite pure
form of earmarking  with considerable reliance on benefit-cost
considerations in investment decisions.  Valorization appears to be popular
and--in some instances--offers a  way round resistance to property tax
increases.  Its extension to cities  which have yet to make substantial use
of it (i.e.,  beyond the  major cities)  merits consideration.
76.  The recommendations  made above  would substantially  xduce the
number of earmarked funds and the extent of government monies earmarked,
thus imparting greater flexibility to the government budget at all levels.
Earmarking would be limited to revenue sharing, payroll taxes for so_ial
security, and those few cases  where benefit connections are clear and
pricing arrangements appear to generate appropriate levels of resources.
Even in these cases (especially  the first and third), the commitment to
earmarking ought not to be open-ended.  In each case, a date should be set
when the automatic financing arrangement  would be reviewed, or better, when
the arrangement  would be terminated unless expressly renewed.  This would
permit adjustments to changing circumstances and force a review of the
pricing arrangements, the quality of investments financed, and the past and
future growth of infrastructure in the sector relative to needs.- 69 -
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STATISTICA1  APPENDIX
Earmarking  in Colombia
Al.  Total  Public  Revenue  and  Incomes: National,  Departmental,  Municipal
Levels,  1970-87.
A2.  Earmarking  of  Revenue: National,  Departmental,  and  Municipal,  1970-87.
A3.  Situado  Fiscal: Share  of Tax  Allowance  in  National  Government's
Revenues
A4.  Situado  Fiscal: Jurisdictional  Shares  in the  Tax  Allowance,  1980-87.
A5.  Situado  Fiscal: Share  of Education  and  Health  in  Divisional/
Territorial  Tax  Allowances,  1980-87.
A6.  Distribution  of Situado  Fiscal,  1980-87.
A7.  Fondo  Nacional  del  Cafe:  Income  and  Expenditures,  1979-87.
A8.  Fondo  Vial  Nacional  (F.V.N): Total  Expenditures,  1980-87.
A9.  Fondo  Vial  Nacional  (F.V.N.): Total  Revenues,  1980-87.
A10.  Fondo  de Promocion  de Exportaciones  (PROEXPO):  Total  Expenditures,
1980-87.
All.  Fondo  de Promocion  de Exportaciones  (PROEXPO):  Total  Revenues,
1980-87.
A12.  Servicio  Nacional  de Aprendizaje  (SENA): Total  Expenditures,  1980-87.
A13.  Servicio  Nacional  de  Aprendizaje  (SENA): Total  Revenues,  1980-87.
A14.  Instituto  Colombiano  de Bienestar  Familiar  (1CBF): Total  Expenditure,
1980-87.
A15.  Instituto  Colombiano  de Bienestar  Familiar  (ICBF): Total  Revenues,
1980-87.
A16.  Cajas  de Compensacion  Familiar: Revenues  and  Expenditures,  1980-87.- 72  -
Table Al  Totel  Public Revenue and Income,  National,  Depaertmntal  and  Municipal Level,  1970-87
(Million,  of  Colombian  Current  Peace)
1970  1975  1940  19l1  1982  1963  1964  1985  1964  1997
National  L*vel  Revenues
A. Central  GOwerment  (-  1+3)  20,361  66,009  206.205  279.627  356,592  396,367  426.550  631,666  911.553  1.234.950
1.  Current  Revenue  12,139  *1,619  168,247  221,792  279.955  296,960  300,U64  464,674  690,435  964.174
s.  Tax  Revenues  11.624  39,745  143,332  212.566  266,811  273,560  263.636  421,695  606,803  M11.766
b.  Non-Uas  Revenues  765  2,074  4.915  9.224  13.144  23,400  17,248  42.781  83,632  150.406
2.  Transfers  Notional
Docentralitzed  Agencis  3.23J  1.056  55,846  70.564  66,856  99,823  114,241  134,046  165,056  255,565
3.  Other  Incoe  Natioual
Public  4encie.  7,992  24.190  39,956  38.035  78.637  99,407  125,.66  167,212  221.1i8  270.77%
a. Tax  Uevenues  414  1.699  1,447  2,160  2,136  3.627  5.111  7,448  ,566  8.638
b.  Other Transfers  443  606  3,996  7.436  6,744  8,093  7.162  7,666  13,294  13.053
c.  Cross  Operating
Incmee  1/  7,135  21,663  34,493  46.419  67,757  67.687  113,393  1  2.078  199,256  249,079
6.  Operating  Surplue  Non-Financial
Decentralized  Agencies  3,372  7,850  6.525  12,426  31,956  36.669  65,416  61.633  50,081  139.944
C.  Socia  Security  Contributions  2/  2,269  7.,22  29.799  41.857  56,213  77.161  99,215  123,435  166.624  210,604
1.  Retire"nt  and  Severanc.
Contributions  n.a.  n.m.  22,277  31,69.4  41,675  59,439  76,102  95.00:  131.658  162.921
2. Payroll  Taxes  armarked  for
Decentralized  Agenci4s  na.  na.  7,522  10,163  14.538  17,722  23.113  26.433  37.166  47.663
a.  for  the  SOtA  na..  n  ..  3,616  5,193  7,936  9,088  12.16'  14,423  16.255  23.195
b.  fcr  tck  ICIF  n.a.  n.e.  3.564  4,872  6.464  8,531  10,766  13.867  17,831  23.534
e  CAJANAL  n..  n..  122  96  136  103  156  143  1,079  954
D. Total  Current  Revenu9  -
Notional  26,042  61,661  246,529  334,112  446.761  510,197  591,151  *16,956  1,130,458  1.565,496
1.  Departental  Level  avenues 3/
A.  Departmnt  Central  Level  2,697  6,589  21,601  26,436  33.354  43,935  61,185  79.682  102.605  n.e.
1. Tax  tevenues  2.535  S,638  20,166  25,627  30,444  39.690  54.018  66,564  67,471  n.e.
a.  Liquor  *i  1,086  2,563  10,174  12.!50  14,866  18,612  23,766  30.123  361939  n.a.
b.  Tobacco  607  1,537  4.606  6,069  6.353  9,218  12,.93  15,680  20.26'  n.o.
c.  Beer  562  1,269  4.353  6,171  7.656  9,731  11,856  15,013  19,238  n.s.
d.  Other  260  249  1,033  1  437  1,566  2.129  6,103  7,546  9.010  n.s.
2.  Non-Tax  ?.venues  162  95.  1,405  2,609  1I/  2,910  4,245  7,147  11,116  15,134  na..
S.  Social  Security  n.S.  n.e.  1,475  2,233  2,721  3,468  2,960  S/  6.216  n.s.  n.*.
C. Opereting  Surplus  In..
financial Departmental
Enterpris  5/  n  .S.  2.600  10/  4,043  4,529  5,750  7,492  9,469  7/  11,067  7/  10,224  14/  n.e.
D.  Total  Current  Revemnue  -
Departmental  n.e.  nU..  27,119  35,198  41,825  54.695  73,614  96,97  112.8;9- 73  -
(Continued)
Table  Al Total  Public  Revenue  and  Income.,  National  Deoartmental  and  Municipal  Level.  1970.d7
(Hillions  of  Colombian  Current  Pesos)
1970  1975  150  1961  1962  19$3  1984  1965  1966  1967
lIl.  Capital  Cities  Municipal
Incms I/
A.  Central  AdmimLetretion
Municipal  Level  1.550  3.236  11.59  15.504  19.d26  25.006  34.695  44.402  42.623  n.e.
1. Tea  Uevenue  1,179  2.458  *.750  11,644  15.211  20,100  29,063  37.062  *2.623  na.
a.  Industry  and  Co_merce  193  624  2.968  4*105  5.551  7.026  12,533  16,616  16t261  na.
b.  Land Tax  369  660  2.567  3,426  4.502  5.772  7,310  10,011  12,399  na.
c.  Valorization  Tax 9/  261  461  2.067  2,563  3.291  5.309  5.937  14/  6.063  14/  6,967  14/  n.e.
d.  Other  356  513  1,146  1.530  1  .U7  1,993  5,263  4,350  4,976  n.e.
2. Von-Tax  Revenues  371  760  2.S39  3,662  4,617  4.994  S.632  7,340  n.a.  na.
a.  Total  except  Bogota  166  264  1.276  1.717  2,095  1.d07  2,348  3.254  n.e.  n.a.
b. Bogota  _/  205  516  1.563  2.145  2.522  3.169  3.464  4.06d  n.D.  n.a.
S. Social  Security  n.  n.n.  679  9S6  1.269  2.096  2.61S  3,716  n.a.  n.a.
C.  Operating  Surplus  Departmental
Laterpriae.  11/  n.e  2.220  6.370  14,374  20.012  24,539  32.064  56,517  12/  77.700  13/
D.  Total  Currant  levenAe
Municipal  na  n..  20,436  30.866  41,129  51,733  69,577  104,635  n.a.  n.a.
IV.  Total  Geormant  x  veouas
Ail  Levels  n.a.  n.e.  294.266  400.176  529,715  616* 825  734,372  1.016,556  n.e.  n.a.
Potesi
I. Gross  operating  income  of  national  decentralized  agencies  such  as  ICEL (electricity),  TELECOM  (tel.co.unications),  end  ICT  (housing)  and the
sociel  security  agencies.
2. tSS.  CAJAIIAL,  Pondo Nacional  del  Ahorro  (National  Sevings  Fund)k.  CAPRZCO(.  Militery  Force  Retiresent  Pund.  National  Police  Ketira*ent  F_nd.
3.  Excludee  transfers  from  central  goveroment  and  interdepartmntal  tranefera.  Includes  oil  royalties.
4.  Includes  transfere  from  tho  distilleries.
5. Social  welfare  agsncieas  lotteries,  distillaries  net  operating  income.
6. Some  departsental  information  missing.
7. Som transfers  to  other  departmental  egencels  included.
S.  Transfers  from  higher  levels  of  goverment  excluded.
9. Tsxes  collected  directly  by  the  agencies.
10. Ieer  and tobaeco  taxes  in  Bogota.
(1.  Public  utilities  and  Bogota  lottery.
!2. Bogota.  hdelline,  nd  Cal.
12. Bogotc  and  Hedellin.
14.  Estimate.- 74  -
Eamna'imof  e,maea  U1i.al,  Ve,rtlebtlal,  Masteiogl  1970-07
,tLit  Cele  _i  Curwo_t  Poo)
1070  1675  1960  1961  1908  1061  1064  1065  1964  1967
1.  Kerueke  Ftm.  U.ia  Leve
A.  Tan  o  C..V.  aWL of  l7_erts  72  736  6.641  7,004  11,595  10,657  17.395  22,S25  35,337  54.647
1.  12  tea  fort  0  a  0  a  0  0  4.645  6.0S  5  *.290  11.647
a.  Caja  4nrarU (402)  0  0  0  0  0  0  2,340  3,01  4,147  5,672
b.  Induatrial  (111)  (402)  0  0  0  0  0  0  2,305  3,047  4,152  5,975
c2  2  e  fo  Proea  72  754  4.U61  7.904  11,595  10.S57  12.749  16,740  27.030  43,200
S.  Pyroll  taea  146  147  29,799  41.057  56,213  77,141  99,215  123,435  16.824  210.604
1. am  0  0  35,16  5.193  7.936  9*0O  12,167  14,423  18,256  23,195
2.  7CI.?.  140  112  *5,4  4,672  4,44  6,531  10.  7U  13,667  17,631  23.534
3.  Cajema  6  15  122  9O  134  103  156  143  1,079  954
4.  letiremat  *Nd Swerenee
payute  U.S.  S.&.  22,277  31,494  41,675  59,456  74,102  95,002  131,456  162.921
C.  Ocoeline  Taa  771  1.637  14,973  22,234  24,06  24.041  27,499  39,640  44,495  59,600
1.  liahya  fuad  (752)  579  1.226  12,750  16.476  186404  16,061  21,354  24,474  32,792  42,765
2.  S6.l  lOad.  Yu"  (102)  77  1I4  1.497  2,223  2.4u1  2,406  2.456  5,264  5,u40  6,334
3.  Utsiosl  lilveys (102)  77  164  1,697  2,223  2,461  2.406  2,456  5,244  5.480  6,334
4.  Transport  fund  (52)  39  62  $49  1,112  1,240  1,204  1,229  2.632  2.741  3.167
D.  Tea  an  Internatial  travel  40  n.S.  697  1.531  2,463  2,424  3.117  3.SO  3,425  4,426
S.  42  Coffee  eaport  tax  1,034  2.369  3,606  5.367  3,735  4,032  5,63S  6.756  17,664  14,005
1,  Coffee  fund  (602)  n.e.  c  .o.  601  SO4  422  673  939  1.459  2.961  2.334
2.  Coffee  Private  Federation,
Rural  Sono  (202)  ua.  c  e..  3,005  2,623  3,113  3,377  4*699  7,299  14,905  11,671
F.  s5  Tourim  Tra  a  132  345  512  736  623  241  213  327  542
G.  Movie Ta  0  0  a  0  0  0  0  0  221  505
H. Participations  and
Cootributioem  151  405  1,225  1,01S  2,163  353,4  3643  6,SS0  9,04  1.1063
1.  Banks Legultory  Cmilasioo  41  164  550  129  974  1.242  1.564  2,461  3.471  2.940
2.  Privat.  firt  Re  gulatory
CormisesLo  35  64  290  394  552  743  943  1.410  1.572  2.736
3.  Contribution  Contraloris
General  55  151  330  463  439  775  1,069  1,690  2,312  3,096
4.  fasily  funds  Laguatory
Coerniest  0  0  0  0  0  0  217  172  190  348
5.  Industry  en  Cnemre  l2eo atory
Cimnissio  0  0  6  15  11  0  0  0  96  140
6.  1even  Shbrin  AeronauticS  Funed 0  0  49  17  9  275  10  105  106  51
7.  Superintetnmncia  de  Wotariad
y  lagietro  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  2.264  13'5  1,750
1.  Spcl*  FPunec  5  90  66  t0  74  573  1,127  3.206  4,956  6.212
1.  Natinal  D.tes"  fund  5  72  1  0  1  438  $76  933  1,145  1.327
2.  CoaWnicatio.  fund  a  0  1  49  25  69  196  227  367  404
5 UgucetioUel  Srvte..row  0  0  0  0  0  0  a  0  0  a
4.  Tea  Education  fP  0  16  4U  41  49  46  55  is  71  65
5.  C,il  Fund  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  632  1,966  2,995
6.  Agricultural  moetion  Fimd  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  350  274  67
7.lioefund  0  a  0  0  0  0  0  171  251  240
S  Cocoaeued  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  300  416  557
9. CerealFud  0  0  0  0  a  0  0  1$7  211  354
10. 6tec*  rkLt*  legulatory
Cemissit  0  0  0  0  0  0  a  50  35  23
11.  Food  letaterti  do  Advmee  0  0  0  0  0  0  a  70  160  140
J.  Tranefere  en  levern.  S*arbin  3149  4,40  29,206  39,744  53.671  U3.794  87,941  110,765  131,426  190,29'
1.  Tea  Allaenee  (dugatio.
lcaltb)  0  4,503  19.43U  26.912  93.646  47.219  56,626  69.400  753616  109,862
2.  Sae  Ta  349  2,305  9,766  10,632  17,965  16.575  29.313  41,165  55,560  60,432lable A3  Share of Tax Allowance in National Government's  Revenues
(millions  of pesos; percentages)
1975  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987
Current Revenues  41,819  168,247  221,792  279,955  296,960  330,884  464,676  690,435  964,176
Less: Earmarked
Revenuesa  5,325  35,935  44,120  60,051  60,371  88,174  127,761  173,302  231,634
Equals: Ordinary
Revenues  36,494  132,312  177,672  219,904  236,589  242,710  336,738  517,133  732,542
Tax Allowance  4,303  19,438  28,912  38,886  47,219  58,628  69,600  75,838  109,862
Tax Allowance +
Ordinary Revenues
X100  11.8  14.7  16.3  17.7  20.0  24.2  20.7  14.7  15.0
a.  Included in earmarked revenues  are the taxes on imports  C.I.F., gasoline, international  travel,
tourism,  cinema tickets, and after 1984 the ad valorem tax on coffee exports; also included are
contributions and participations, the special funds,  and the salea tax (or IVA)  transfer.
Source:  Information supplied  by Contraloria  General de la Republica.- 76  -




Division/  Population  in  Tax
Territory  Share  Allowance&  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987
Antioqula  14.2  10.85  11.61  10.92  11.33  11.08 11.08  11.20 11.06 11.10
Atlantico  4.1  3.78  3.13  3.70  3.45  3.74  3.76  3.41  3.45  3.36
Bogota  9.7  7.70  8.51  10.32  9.47  8.36  0,37  9.04  8.83  9.32
Bolivar  4.0  3.71  3.26  3.47  3.30  3.59  Z.31  3.25  3.41  3.44
Boyaca  6.1  5.18  4.77  4.44  4.96  4.84  4.99  5.17  5.11  5.28
Caldas  4.1  3.78  3.66  3.77  3.89  3.76  3.60  3.56  3.77  3.41
Cauca  3.5  3.36  3.16  2.99  2.98  3.08  2.87  2.73  2.85  2.88
Cesar  1.5  1.96  1.89  1.78  1.95  2.17  1.99  1.92  1.96  1.85
Choco  1.0  1.61  1.67  1.73  1.72  1.90  1.92  1.82  1.79  1.88
Cordoba  3.4  3.29  3.58  3.65  3.62  3.68  3.18  3.53  3.61  3.43
Cundinamarca  6.4  5.39  7.12  6.67  6.67  6.37  6.57  6.84  6.85  6.91
Guajira  0.8  1.47  1.23  2.21  1.42  1.44  1.34  1.34  2.51  2.58
Hulla  2.4  2.59  2.85  1.55  2.76  2.73  2.94  2.76  1.48  1.44
Magdalena  3.0  3.01  2.82  2.97  3.05  2.98  2.75  2.97  2.86  2.98
Meta  1.0  1.61  1.48  1.49  1.34  1.64  1.61  1.46  1.61  1.56
Narina  4.0  3.71  3.91  3.39  3.68  3.77  3.95  3.70  3.61  3.70
Norte  de
Santander  3.1  3.08  3.42  3.14  3.53  3.04  3.36  3.74  3.59  3.55
Quindio  1.8  2.17  2.15  1.91  1.89  2.04  1.83  !.75  1.69  1.74
Risaralda  2.5  2.66  2.45  2.40  2.38  2.70  2.46  2.50  2.46  2.54
Santander  5.8  4.97  5.19  6.06  5.47  4.96  5.22  5.98  5.84  6.04
Sucre  1.8  2.17  1.97  2.02  1.94  2.27  2.00  2.01  1.97  1.94
Tolima  4.9  4.34  4.59  4.18  4.44  4.34  4.88  4.09  4.29  4.18
Valle  del
Cauca  10.0  7.91  7.31  6.97  6.71  7.62  6.79  6.95  6.78  6.82
Arauca  0.1  0.98  0.79  0.79  0.79  0.82  0.82  0.81  0.91  0.81
Caqueta  0.6  1.33  1.15  1.16  1.06  1.36  1.07  1.33  1.38  1.43
Casanare  n.a.  0.912  0.93  0.92  0.92  0.80  0.98  1.12  1.29  1.17
Putumayo  0.3  1.12  0.95  0.98  0.88  1.06  0.95  0.99  1.16  0.98
San  Andres  0.1  0.98  0.77  0.76  0.75  0.73  0.75  0.71  0.82  0.69
Amazonas  0.1  0.98  0.74  0.74  0.74  0.73  0.74  0.65  0.57  0.53
Guainia  0.0  o.91b  0.73  0.73  0.71  0.69  0.71  0.63  0.66  0.61
Guaviare  n.a.  O.91b  0.70  0.72  0.71  0.69  0.72  0.63  0.64  0.76
Vaupae  0.1  0.98  0.75  0.74  0.73  0.71  0.75  0.68  0.49  0.47
Vichada  0.1  0.98  0.75  0.74  0.73  0.62  0.72  0.69  0.71  0.63
TOTAL  100.0  100.0  100.0  ICO.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
a/  According  to  the  sharing  formula,  the  1th jurisdictions  share  in  "situado  fiscal"  is  equal
to  .3/33  +  .7  Pi/Pop  where  Pi/Pop  is  a  constant  since  it  is  based  on the  1964  census.
b/  Jurisdictions  with  virtually  no  population  in 1964  or  which  did  not  exist  in 1964 are  entered  as
sharing  in the  non-population  component--i.e.  1/33  of 302.
Source: Data  supplied  by Contraloria  General  de la  Republica  and  mission  estimates.- 77  -
Table  A5  Share of  Iducetio  eand  selth  in  Divtetont.l/Territorl  Tra  AU4lwencee.  1960-87
(percentages
DivitSon/  1960  It61  1962  1963  194  1965  1966  1967
Territory  I  I  I  I  a  I  I  *  d  a  I  R  I  I  I  i
Antioquis  60.96  19.04  76.30  21.70  77.59  22.41  76.49  11.51  7t.27  21.13  75.S0  24.20  71.63  26.15  76.34  ;1.66
Atjantico  75.41  24.59  73.31  24.64  77.03  22.97  75.17  24.63  75.46  24.52  70.01  29.99  6C.13  31.67  72.55  27.45
Bogota  61.50  16.50  76.94  21.06  51.91  16.09  77.61  22.19  71.47  21.53  71.S6  26.12  72.S3  27.47  75.76  24.24
Bolivar  74.97  23.03  72.13  27.67  72.45  27.55  74.01  25.99  72.22  27.76  46.37 31.43  67.23  32.77  69.39  30.61
Soysce  79.20  20.60  77.1$  22.42  60.03  19.97  76.40  21.40  79.17  20.83  76.74  23.26  73.93  26.07  77.21  22.79
Caldas  79.07  20.93  78.97  21.03  76.76  21.22  76.53  21.45  76.76  21.22  76.30  23.42  71.60  28.20  75.49  24.51
Cauca  78.50  21.50  75.20  24.60  73.44  26.34  77.62  22.38  70.72  29.26  47.86  32.12  43.75  24.25  49.06  30.92
Ceesr  76.$5  21.15  73.93  24.07  74.44  25.34  71.73  26.17  74.42  23.S  49.34  30.44  49.52  30.48  72.36  27.44
Choco  79.94  20.06  76.25  23.75  49.61  30.39  77.49  27.51  77.39  22.41  71.74  28.26  72.27  27.73  78.50  21.50
Cordoba  61.47  10.53  73.513  24.47  76.46  21.52  77.14  22.64  76.41  21.59  73.95  24.05  72.24  27.74  74.00  26.00
Cundinarea  64.54  15.46  61.73  1S.27  61.66  16.12  87.63  12.17  61.45  18.55  79.62  20.18  77.32  22.6S  61.45  16.55
Guajire  75.42  24.56  64.64  15.16  46.24  33.76  44.$4  33.14  45.44  34.34  40.41  39.57  62.31  17.49  65.54  14.46
Huila  61.59  16.14  63.25  34.75  79.20  20.60  72.77  27.33  76.14  21.84  74.64  23.36  53.93  46.07  56.50  43.47
Megdeleaa  76.14  21.S6  46.06  33.92  47.99  32.01  73.31  26.69  69.98  30.02  70.22  29.76  70.16  29.82  70.94  29.06
oats  76.40  21.60  74.25  25.75  73.51  24.49  73.64  24.16  71.66  26.12  47.55  32.45  70.03  29.97  75.95  24.05
Narinc  60.53  19.47  76.02  23.96  73.39  26.61  73.43  24.57  75.72  26.26  67.93  32.07  68.77  31.23  70.71  29.2t
Norte  de
Santander  61.83  16.17  75.14  24.64  61.20  16.dO  77.55  22.45  77.46  22.54  71.67  29.13  72.03  27.97  75.06  24.94
quindio  79.67  20.33  75.77  24.23  75.37  24.43  75.78  24.22  72.93  27.07  45.11  34.89  65.29  34.71  71.31  28.69
Risaralde  77.73  22.27  76.77  23.23  76.30  23.70  75.60  24.20  73.70  26.30  69.50  30.50  68.76  31.22  71.61  26.39
Sent:sd.r  60.65  19.35  60.66  19.34  76.53  21.47  76.56  23.44  77.17  22.83  73.13  26.87  74.46  25.54  74.78  25.22
Sucre  77.5.  22.45  71.53  26.47  72.75  27.25  73.35  24.45  73.93  26.07  *7.12  32.66  47.76  32.22  73.06  26.94
Tolime  $0.96  190.4  78.15  21.8  74.62  25.38  76.67  21.33  79.92  20.06  74.03  25.97  49.16  30.64  75.37  24.63
VUell  del
Cauc,  76.10  21.90  76.14  23.$6  75.17  24.63  76.83  23.17  72.47  27.53  66.45  33.35  45.36  34.62  70.19  29.81
Arauce  74.51  25.49  73.57  26.43  73.14  26.56  75.62  24.16  71.61  28.39  73.49  26.51  72.94  27.06  71.83  28.17
Caqust&  76.79  23.21  76.12  23.$$  75.16  24.62  70.45  29.35  72.16  27.64  74.30  25.70  72.93  27.07  79.47  20.53
Casasare  74.03  25.97  73.6S  26.32  73.54  26.46  64.13  15.87  75.22  24.76  79.92  20.08  77.16  22.62  78.08  21.92
Putuuayo  75*54  24.46  74.65  25.35  72.97  27.03  69.50  30.50  73.17  26.83  70.74  29.26  74.17  23.83  73.17  26.83
Son  Andrea  74.00  26.00  73.30  26.70  74.04  25.94  71.16  28.82  72.44  27.56  72.23  27.77  45.76  34.24  68.68  21.32
A:azonae  73.43  26.57  73.63  26.17  73.96  26.04  70.14  29.86  73.32  26.68  70.64  29.36  57.97  42.03  59.86  40.14
Guainia  73.76  26.24  72.86  27.14  74.01  25.99  71.69  26.31  73.25  26.75  71.30  29.70  65.59  34.41  66.17  33.83
Gu&viere  70.60  29.20  73.91  26.09  74.01  25.99  71.04  28.96  71.53  26.47  70.34  29.66  64.32  35.46  73.18  26.82
Veup.z  73.79  26.21  73.71  24.29  74.04  25.64  71.64  26.36  70.64  29.16  72.21  27.79  51.35  46.45  54.86  45.14
tichads  73.79  24.21  73.71  26.29  73.94  26.06  82.19  17.61  73.12  26.62  72.56  27.44  67.22  32.78  6 6.57  33.43
TOTAL  79.56  20.42  76.51  23.49  76.79  23.21  76.45  23.55  74.16  23.84  72.37  27.63  70.60  29.70  74.52  25.48
Soureess  From  data  supplied  by  Contraloria  Genral d.  is  Republics..0bflAS*S*SO.￿￿...0,  A
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TaIble  8,  rondo  Kaclonal  4.1  Cate; Oncog.  and Waendliurso.  1979.87
1979  1980  1981  I82s]8  1993  1964os  9188  It87  .I
1.  e-nses  109846.3.  153,827.2  87,94l.4  92.  777.4  108,967.8  I90.21l,2  284,049.9  827,981.4  312,246.8
A.  Operational  78,809.3  118,792.4  89,371.2  37,094,0  47.619,8  118,2)0.3  1351,90.I  409,139.9  220,032.0
Coffee  Sa..4  74.400,5  118,792.8  89,371.2  57.098,0  47.818,8  114,220.3  133.190.I  809,139..  n1.6.
I.  Goff..  fo,  eaorr  ',25.  114.05222  47,000.4  34,379  39397  102,399.2I  I23,3I7.8:  228:,908.9  s
2.Cffee  for:apo  936.  89.7  919,2  923  ,383,  2,139.  3,33.  ,99,  n..
2.  Coffee:  ffor, 10  Retentoa  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  ni.e.
Consornprton  1.524.8  2,121.3  1.851.8  1.78394  2,093.8  2,433.3  3,157.1  3,802.9  U.S.
1.  Other  operating  rev.  1,430.7  2.393,3  232.83.  2,138.2  2,939.3  4,230.9  8,327.3  10,399.8  10,293.2
I.  2713cr  1!oo:8s  sales  1,210.8  4,082.9  3,102.9  2,802,9  2,302.1  2,870,8  3.892,7  8.938,8  10,293.2
2.  Fege reat  ee.  t
(Freights)  020.1  2108  822.9  5323.4  437.8  780.3  03.  1,433.4  n.e.
C.  Trea,,fere  32.318,6  34.121,2  12,419.9  24.643,9  22,839.1  86,440.3  89.908,1  199,049.0  203,870.3
I.  from the  Central
Government  2.489,4  3,003.0  2,822.0  3,112.8  2,377.0  4,899.3  7,299.7  14,903.2  11.871,1
A5 valorem  Tea  2,488.8  3,003.0  2,923.0  3,l12.8  3,377.0  4.898,5  7,298,7  14,903.2  11,871.1
2. Froqa  the  Privet.
Sector  45,848.2  31,l18.2  9,398.9  23,331.2  29,282.1  81,782.0  81,807.8  174.142,8  194,199.4
a, Setention-in.kind  29,4532.7  31,099,2  9,368.6  223,l0.3  29 148.3  81,339,9  80,621.1  172.387.8  n.e.
b. Ret.ntLon-in-oalue  292.3  19.0  8.1  20.7  113.8  202.1  788.3  1,378.0  a.m.
D.  rinancIal  Reve..noe  1,433.8  2,447,2  2,334.9  2,321,9  2,729.9  2,880.9  12,820,0  17,806.0  31,  108.4
C.  Other  R.ven-s  34.6  83.2  39.7  8.379,3  21.3  328.3  1,008.4  1,873.2  241.90.?
Ex  lpendituree  97.221,1  130,340.2  74,5336.8  92,237.0  100,827.3  138,902.2  173.800,9  407.230,7  483414.0
A.  OporationaI  expenditures  39,757.3  83,304.2  38,911.2  83,190.2  83.284,7  73,887.9  64,214.4  142.214,4  288,700.9
1.  Coffee  Purchases  39,737.3  65.304,2  38,911.2  43.190,2  4536.4,7  72.897,9  84,218.4  142.214,4  248,700.9
S.  Other  Rcoendltoree  4,923,4  3,999.1  8,800.2  8,137.0  9,942.2  1,3952.9  17,123.2  23,289.3  208,130.0
1.  Coinerciall  expenditures  3,81.8AI4  4,279.7  4,132.9  8,810.3  3,904.3  8,288.0  11,137,8  17,723.1  138,089.0
a.Co"'.eei"n  497.8  998,0  919,9  1,189.3  1,290.3  1,293.9  23283.3  2,838.9  n.e.
4.FrIht  cha  s  2347  2,75333  1,932.3  2,178.7  2,827.4  2,981.3  3,284.8  4,731.3  n.e.
c.  Ad"ertiaing  142.7  123,4  723.4  933,7  1,094.3  2,081.5  2,042.3  5,988,1  n.e.
4.Foreign promotion  0  0  0  0  727,4  988.0  243.0  1,744.0  ne
e  c kereg  ing  50,9  703.0  537.1  508.4  836.i  1,034.8  1,187.4  1,788.35.e
f.Quality  changee  (38.3)  0  0  0.2  (681.41  4.7  792.3  n.a.
2.  Coffee  Handling  1.321,.0  1,  718.8  2,847.3  3,348.3  2,937.9  5,238,9  3,967.4  7,848.4  54,723,35
a.  Trashing  expenditu.res  502.6  499.0  883,0  692.6  794  3  870.9  1,288.7  1,303,7  ne
3.  Storafe  928.9  1,033.8  1.330.0  2,247.2  2,878.8  2,743.1  4,401.8  5,901.7  nr.a
c.  Forte  expenditures  12 8 .7  1603  .4  117.8  138.9  131.1  145.5  1  52,.7  170.5  n.a.
0.  Ttereet peymente  0  0  '46.7  271.8  133.7  477.9  124.2  8.3  n.s.
elns.r-nco  0,9  2.2  J0  0  0  0  0  4
3.  0rh.,  Goode  ,.3$0.9  2,427.8  3,460.6  3,077.1  3.917,4  4,298.0  8,848.3  12,371,1  13,307.8
a, 0ther  Goods
P.,,cha..s  1,019.9  1,776.6  2,946.8  2,301.1  3.224,3  3.483,0  3,225.7  10,086.0  11,894.l
b.  Other  G-ood
Enperrditures  361,0  831.2  514.0  576.0  892,1  833.0  1,820.8  2,543.1  3,613.3
C.Price  differentials
Adj,..toents  6,318.1  13,773.2  3,860,4  3,378.1  8.900.l  3,002.6  4,943.1  49.814,8  n.e.
D. Transfers  37,003.3  43,647,2  132359,8  22,103.3  21,233.1  40,939.0  33,048.1  146,283.9  n.e.
E. Ads,init  ti.nn  4,817.8  6,620.3  3,G11.9  3,909,9  4,911.'  7.761.2  10,922.3  13,423.0  17,824.7
I.  Fad, to  Administration  1,393.9  2  ,  '70  .7  2,810.1  3.919,8  4,903.3  7,671.3  10,928.7  13,397.2  17,183.8
2.  Conr,sioris  3.8  31,4  56,7  70.5  9.2  89.7  8.9  225.8  280.9
3.  Exchange  rate  10ees.
(certificetes)  3,028.4  4,098,8  145.1  0  0  0  0  0  0
F. Intereat  payments  2,746.7  2,259.0  2,894,0  5,482,9  9,972.1  18,082,9  11,029.3  '.019.7  17,785.4
G. Other  expenditurtes  443.2  6.31lT.2  4383  a48562.3  418.4  1,367.8  3,432.3  10.354.5  5,373.1
A. tnf los  minue  outflone
totel  (t  - 1II  12.642,1  5,497.1  (6.613.2)  1,340.4  8,109.9  31,279.0  98,849.1  220,820.7  16,832.8
Minu.-  Exchange  Losese  0  0  0  908.1  9.424,1  3,317.7  11,74,0.3  9,047.2  0
B.  Surpluse  or  Deficit  12,642,1  5,497.1  (6.615.2)  836.3  1,883.8  22,881.2  78,909.8  229,877.9  l8,832.8
Minuet  Roesorve  0  203.4  0  0  0  9  0  0  2,9381.9
C.Surplue  or  Oefictt  12,882.1  5,291.7  (8.813.2)  828.3  1,893.8  25,841.3  74,908.8  229,877.9  18,832.8
D.  Internal  cash  flow  31,247.3  47,882.4  7,596.8  4,883.0  16,351.0  31,990.8  80,377.8  231,9853.  (224.3027
1917,  Io,e.  of  the  dAts are  not  available.  The source  ts F9C  hut  differs  frog  1880.98.
5o-ce-  Fond.  Nacional  del  Cafe. Actual  dote,Table  A8  fondo  Vial  Nacional  (F.V.N.):  Total  Expenditures.  1979-87
(Milliois  of  Colotabin  S)
Progr  and  Projects  1.  (S)  1981  (S)  1982  (CL  1983  C)  1984  ()  1985  (S)  1986  (X)  1987  (S)
1.  Highway construction,
repairing  and
mintenance  10,'  .0  68.8  15,112.0  65.2  13,127.0  48.6  13,380.0  45.4  15,615.0  44.8  22,463.5  50.3  26,078.0  49.4  42,900.9  50.2
II.  Technical  Services
an  Special  Studies  C  .0  1.8  524.0  2.3  581.0  2.2  362.0  1.2  892.0  2.6  2,022.9  4.5  2,467.5  4.7  3,631.2  4.2
Ill.  Equipment  Investment  ?.0  1.9  509.0  2.2  2,957.0  11.0  1,682.0  5.7  842.C  2.4  1,517.8  3.4  909.7  1.7  634.3  0.7
IV.  Highways  Safety  Control  .0  0.3  49.0  0.2  60.0  0.2  94.0  0.3  483.0  1.4  945.4  2.1  341.2  0.6  602.4  0.7
V.  Other  Roads Maintenance
and District  Admini-
stration  3,+-  .0  23.2  5,552.0  24.0  8,185.0  30.3  10,734.0  36.4  11,363.0  32.6  11,895.4  26.6  13,598.9  25.8  18,933.1  22.1  1
VI.  Maritime  ard  Riverways 
Co
Transportation  -- 0  3.3  1,342.0  5.8  2,019.0  7.5  2,194.0  7.4  4,271.0  12.3  3,143.7  7.0  3,871.2  7.3  3,918.0  4.6
Vil.  Debt  Servicing  .0  0.7  79.0  0.3  69.0  0.3  1,005.0  3.4  1,357.0  3.9  2,691.1  6.0  5,502.2  10.4  14,868.1  17.4
1.  ExternaLt  .0  0.0  0.0  0.0  17.0  0.1  767.0  2.6  1,146.0  3.3  2,290.1  5.1  4,727.1  9.0  10,807.4  12.6
2.  Internal  113.0  0.7  79.0  0.3  52.U  0.2  236.0  0.8  211.0  0.6  401.0  0.9  775.1  1.5  4,060.8  4.8
Total  Gastos  15,818.0  100.0  .!,167.0  100.0  26,998.0  100.0  29,451.0  100.0  34,823.0  100.0  44,679.7  100.0  52,768.8  100.0  85,488.0  100.0
Source:  NOPT  - Oficins  de  Planeacion  y  0Wreccion  Comercial  y  Financiera  (Estados  Financieros).
Inforues  Financieros  de  Contraloria  Generat  de  la  Republica.Table  A9  Fondo Vial  Nacional  (F.V.N.)  Total  Revenues,  1980-87 I/
(Mlltions  of  Coloabian  S)
Description  1968  (t)  1981  (X)  1982  (X)  1983  (X)  1984  MX)  1985  (S)  1986  (X)  1987
1.  Current  Revenues  14,296.  88.7  18,758.6  91.7  22,281.$  99.2  24,411.2  83.6  26,2'5.5  82.7  32,648.5  87.7  40,393.3  92.5  62,701.9
A.  Operatioatl  :ncome  563.  3.5  8  .0  4.1  1,377.1  6.1  1,885.3  6.5  3,044.0  9.6  4,986.0  .3.4  6,571.4  15.0  12,362.1
1.  Sale  of  Ser,ices  2.  0.0  2.7  0.0  3.8  0.0  17.2  0.1  84.1  .. 3  27.2  0.1  38.6  0.1  70.5
2.  Other  27  560.  3.5  833.3  4.1  1,373.3  6.1  1,868.  1  6.4  2,959.9  9.3  4,958.8  13.3  6,532.8  15.0  12,291.6
B.  Transfers,  Revenue
Sharing,  Taxes  13,733.  8B.2  17,9,2.6  BF.6  20,904.8  93.1  22,525.9  77.2  23,251.-  73.2  27,662.5  74  33,821.9  77.4  50,339.8  I
1.  R.D.E.  3/  12,730.  79.0  16,616.0  h1.5  18,606.0  82.8  18,061.0  61.9  21,354.0  67.2  26,675.7  71.7  32,791.6  75.1  43,765.1  ao
2.  .,udget
transfers  _j  1,003.  6.2  1,246.6  S.1  2,298.8  10.2  4,464.9  15.3  1,897.3  6.0  986.8  2.7  1,030.4  2.4  6,574.7
II.  Capital  Incom  1,826.f-  11.3  1,707.7  3.3  179.3  0.8  4,773.6  16.4  5,484.8  17.3  4,569.8  12.3  3,293.2  7.5  18,190.4
Total  Revenues  1i  123.2  100.0  20,466.3  100.0  22,461.2  100.0  29,184.8  100.0  31,780.1  100.0  37,218.3  100.0  43,686.5  100.0  80,892.3
X R.D.E./Current  Income  89.0  89.0  83.5  74.0  81.2  81.7  81.2
1/  Actual  Figures.
2/  It  includes  toll  revenues  and  revenues  from  agreements  with  other  agencies
/  Gasotine  and ACPH tax.  Proceeds  are  used  for  debt  servicing  and  investmenit.
I/  Other  budget  transfers  for  investment.
Source:  Contraloria  General  de  ta  Aexklica,  Informes  Financieros.  FvII  financiat  reports.TabI. 610  Fo-d. d. P.olnd.  E.Portal6n.  PREKO  . Tot.1 £g.-ditur.a.  1860.8?
D.attlptioo  '0~~~~-F CU  1981  (2)  1982  (Il  1983  (12  1984  (0)  3985  (U  1988  CI)  3887  (1)
Op.,,*Ltoaj £xZp*ndituT*o
1.  Pot.oo.1  S.rIoi.  i),.I  0.?  244.4  0.6  299.6  0.3  463.8  0.6  663.8  0.3  839.8  0.8  3.M9.2  1.1  C.438.2  0.8
It.  G*-ata  Expandlt....  1'.  0.4  135.3  0.3  168.0  0.3  269.7  0.4  373.9  0.4  492.8  0.3  849.?  0.8  864.0  0.3
11.Tr...(...  (I  0.8  117.7  0.3  127.S  0.2  1.374.8  2.1  700.0  0.8  4,641.8  4.6  7,809.3  7.3  379.7  0.2
S.btotai  3.2  2.0  491.6  1.2  393.1  (.0  2.308.3  3.0  3,739.7  (.9  3,274.6  6.0  9,871.2  8.9  2.041.9  3.3
IV.  D.bt  S.-.ictsi  . (.  4.5  1.349.8  1.8  2.243.1  I  .7  1.770.9  2.3  1.9(6.6  2.1  L.911.2  2.0  2.527.5  2.3  3.372.9  1.6
Total  Op-rtta-a
Eap.n4itur.,  W34.13.  6.5  2.067.4  3.0  2,838.2  4.7  4,079.2  5.3  3,436.3  3.5  7,943.8  1.8  (2.398.7  11.1  5,834.8  3.3
la.-It".o  Exy.aditure.
1.  T,;d  Fir
PaotTclpatloo  ~~41.9  0.2  68.4  0.2  40.0  0.1  105.7  0.3  131.3  0.1  (23.9  0.1  270.2  0.2  304.0  0.2
It.  Po5nt  31.4  3.2  (.311.9  3.6  38681.0  4.5  2,805.3  3.7  4,106.3  4.4  33,037.9  13.0  6,743.9  6.1  324.5  0.2
Ill.  Fap-rt C-adit  L-as.  23,11!.1  97.8  16.8(1.7  1,8.6  51,774.7  84.2  68.9(4.8  89.9  82,121.1  88.3  75,603.2  73.4  64.140,7  71.4  329,373.0  72.3 
IV.  B.IlIdtog  a~d  Otban 
00
A ..  to  (..'93.O  4.4  (.068.3  Y.6  3,330.2  -.  726.7  0.9  2.806,4  3.0  627.2  0.6  383.4  0.3  22,243.2  32.4  N
V.  L.  53313883  1  ). 0  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.0  2.996.,-  3.0  3,408.0  4.9  20,744.2  31.4
Total  I-vaat-nt
E  p-nditn.I.  27  9.4  93.3  39 .46 0. 3  13.0  57.255.9  93.)  72,3354.3  94.7  99,163.1  94.1  92,368.4  92.1  96,948.3  88.9  172,990.9  94.7
Tota1  .p-odit.r.a  29.-94.3  100.0  41,327.9  ('A.  60,064.1  100.0  76,633.3  100.0  92,823.4  100.0  i00,33'.2  300.0  3111,347.0  100.0  178.823.7  300.0
lnv.at.anr  ~~~~93.y  93.3  90.3  93.0  92.1  81.8  87.1  74.6
In 3981 CERr  paysnta  i.c1od-  (lbh.  C).ET  a.  aPoot  PI  -ot1on  ta..  .... Ptl-  onnt-...  La..  33  ,allca  11a.al  ba ... o(vI  for CERT and  oth.t  axp-t  1-atl-.  ad.auptlo.
Sourcv:  Gotaol  .. nara.  d. ..  RaP.b1iCs.  I.f.r... Ft....laI--Tf.bl All  Fonlo  do  Pro,octan  do Expo:taclones  (PROEXPO).  Total  R*ever*e. 1960-87
(Mill'ons  of  Colombian  )
DescriptIon  1960  C  r)t)  1982  (2)  1963  (1)  19894  (1  1985  (1  1986  (2)  161  (2)
1.  Curr*n.  ltveen.*  29.452.1  91  C 664-  1 )  S  .6831.8  9'.6  73.080.0  95.4  92.821.4  100.0  97.338.0  100.0  117.604.2  100.0  150.921.C  100.0
A.  Operational  Income  22.791.3  1'  i  i60.  76.5  4A.2  7.3  15.3  62.423.3  81.5  80.072.3  86.3  60.517.t  62.6  90.566.5  17.0  107.721.0  71.9
1. Loan  Ropsysents
a. Principal  20.193.4  64  i.6.Cl.  66.9  4).900.0  68.1  s6.928.7  74.3  713.07B.8  76.Z  70.972.0  72.9  71.846.5  63.6  92.8-9.0  61.5
b.  Interest  2.498.5  1  :4  I  a  8.6  *.280.9  7.1  5.290.9  6.9  6.636.9  7.2  7.997.9  8.2  11.027.0  9.4  13.675.0  9.2
c.  Other  99.6  316.8i  0.9  56.9  0.1  203.1  0.3  356.6  0.4  1.606.)  1.7  4.693.0  6.0  967.0  0.1
*.  Earmarked  Revenueo  6.660.6  2  ,.9 6.4  :9.C  11.,94.5  19.3  10.65S.7  13.9  12.749.1  13.7  16.760.3  17.2  27.0317.7  23.0  43.200.0  28.6
11.  Capitol  Incom4  1.1-3.0  3  j,6  9.  4  3.132.5  5 . 3.954.2  *.6  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0
Total  Revenues  30.595.1  100.0  (  s.1.i9  r  60.064.3  100.0  76.634.2  100.0  92.621.4  100.0  97.338.0  100.0  117.604.2  100.0  150.921.0  0.0  W
2  R.D.E.ICurrent  Income  22.6  49.9  20.4  14.6  13.7  17.2  23.0  2U.6
Soure,4  Contralort  Geneeral  de  Is  Rapublica.  Info."  FIt-.rcl.ros.rabl._  ^12  S-r-.clo  Naclo.sl de APrandlsale (SA)t  Total  Ezpenditures.  1960-87
(Millions  of  Colombian  Sl
Deecziption  19MI  1)  1961  (11  1962  (2)  1983  (2)  1964  (2)  1965  (I)  1966  (I)  1987  (2)
Operat  loal  EapnXs
bad Debt S"ervicln
1.  Personal Services  2,164.4  !.1  2.623.3  43.5  3,276.9  44.6  3,910.1  37.7  1.617.1  10.5  1,670.9  9.6  2,167.4  11.1  2.756.6  10.1
It.  Genral  Expenses  9or4.9  1.3  1.094.6  16.2  1.634.1  22.2  2,031.9  19.6  999.2  6.5  1.165.3  6.2  1,223.0  6.3  1,657.3  6.0
111. Transfers  39 .3  !.7  959.0  15.9  1,484.2  20.2  1.896.3  16.3  2.207.7  14.3  1,053.7  5.5  1,379.3  7.1  1.871.3  6.6
Subtotal  3,529.3  .4  4.677.1  77.6  6,397.2  87.1  7,636.3  75.6  4,624.0  31.3  6,109.9  21.5  4,710.5  24.4  6,265.4  22.9
IV.  Debt ServiLeing  19.5  1.4  17.6  0.3  16.6  0.2  15.6  0.2  14.5  0.1  7.8  0.0  6.9  0.0  t.0  0.0
Total  Operational  Ezpenses
and  Debt Servicing  3,548.5  .1  4.6*6.'  77.9  E.413.S  87.3  7,654.1  75.7  4,838.5  31.4  4,117.7  21.6  4,777.4  24.5  6,293.4  23.0
InvstmntlProexma_
I.  Educational  Buildings
Construction  and
Maintenance  612.9  1.4  950  ..  15.6  612.2  8.3  2.025.5  19.5  3,492.4  22.6  2,160.6  11.3  697.5  3.6  1,tl7.2  6.7
11.  Rlural  Development
Program  197.5  4.1  235.  3.4  204.5  2.8  351.6  3.4  567.0  3.7  407.3  2.1  647.2  3.3  767.0  2.9
111.  Comunity  Participatlon
Program  64.8  1.9  70.1  1.2  66.4  1.2  125.9  1.2  135.3  0.9  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  13.5  0.0
IT.  food  Prograe  10.0  0.2  106.1  1.8  24.2  0.3  12.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0>
V.  bNuan  Resources  lInrs.
structure  and  Rese  ch  0.0  0.0  0.  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1,242.1  8.1  2,316.1  12.1  2,135.6  10.9  2,970.5  10.6
VI.  ScientiLic  a"  T_.cbnology
esearchb and  Protion  0.0  0.0  0.J  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  4,782.1  31.0  6,246.3  32.7  7,474.5  38.3  10.666.9  3t.9
VI*.  Educational  Material and
uipment  0.0  0.0  0. )  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  65.5  0.6  1,026.1  5.4  657.4  4.4  1,032.7  3.6
VII.  Eployees  Social  Velsfre  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1,209.9  6.3  642.1  3.3  1,226.0  4.5
IX.  Industrial  Sector
Promotion  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  216.48  1.1  266.8a  1.4  200.0'  0.7
f.  Vinancial  !2westment  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  505.3  1.6
XI.  Tecbnical  Assistance
and  Plareidg  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  5 00 .0 b  2.6  460.0  2.4  20 0 .3b  0.7
XII.  L4w  5511965  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  8 0 4 .0c  4.6  *.565.0c  6.0  1 .581.64  5.8
1111.  Otbhrs  113.4  2.5  0.0  0.0  4.4  0.1.  0.0  0.0  263.0  1.8  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  60.1  0.3
Total Investment
TZplndituret  1.006.6  2.1  1.I34.8  22.1  931.7  12.1  2.515.0  24.3  *0.567.4  66.6  14.966.6  76.4  14.748.7  75.5  21.104.9  77.0
Total  Expenditures  4.557.1  0.  0  6..14.  100.0  7.345.5  100.0  10.369.1  100.0  15,425.9  100.0  19,064.3  100.0  19,526.1  100.0  27,398.3  100.0
a.  It I,cluded  In  1965  $130  millIons  . vr165  Iet.-n,  !,n  -Ar,rte.anias  d.  Colombt.1  1966,  $161  mtilions1  1987s  $200  millions.
b.  La  55, 555 millions  and  1967,  S2:  .JIII-,  . . . I  saI  c:-sd Sane-C-rtrol  L.tInnoserric&no  de  Informstics  agreement.
C.  L"v  55  reallocated  funds  are  placs  t-lrph  .6r-Is.tL  .i:t  lifforent  agencies.
d.  Las,  55  agreF  enL9,  Pacific  Coast  . .n  d  -. I.s  Fl.nao  Fn;  ,1.001.6  millions for  S.n.-For.do  KEIN (L.y  55165).
e.  In 1967  It belongs  to  Coiw,nity  D.-  cwa.,t  . (Te.I.ing and coeunily  organloatn
Source,  Contralorla  Ge.nral  do  la  Re  7a..  I..  ..c..e  Flnrc.  er,.Tabie  A3  Ssrvlclo  Nacional  do Aprendizal. (SINA),  TotalP.evenues.  1980-.7  !1
(Hillilon  of  Colobilan  6)
DOscrlption  1960  (11  15181  ()  1982  (2)  1983  (2)  1964  (2)  3965  (Z)  196  (2)  1o67  (2)
1.  Current  leyies  4,'-  A  9f6..1  64(N.5  130.0  8,679.5  97.4  11,056.6  87.4  14,319.7  53.0  16.662.7  67.1  20.353.9  99.6  26.435.3  93.4
A.  Operational  IJ  7.  426.9  6.5  376.9  4.2  1,040.6  8.2  1,771.9  10.3  2.094.5  10.9  1.561.5  7.7  2.709.7  9.6
1.  Sale of  Services  !  I.Z  16.6  1.5  106.1  1.2  119.5  0.9  149.9  0.9  172.5  0.9  197.5  1.0  4.7  0.0
2.  A4r5emmte  0.2  4.6  0.1  2.0  0.0  15.6  0.1  14.2  0.1  157.9  0.9  162.1  0.9  23.6  0.6
3. InanLetl  e  remes  :  .4  2.1  290.0  4.4  235.8  2.6  665.0  6.6  1.536.4  .9  1.617.0  6.5  990.6  4.9  1.429.6  5.1
4.  Otbher  ;.  3.8  :35.I  0.3  31.0  0.3  40.5  0.3  69.4  0.4  146.3  0.6  391.0  0.9  1.05.6  3.7
R.  Trassfers 7ad 7.2.  4.  i69.D  l.  &.  3.5  9.302.6  93.1  10.016.2  79.2  12.547.8  72.8  14.566.2  76.  167.92.4  92.1  23.725.6  63.8
1.  Budget  traefore  21  r  6.2  210s.9  4.3  125.6  1.4  325.6  2.6  380.6  2.2  145.6  0.6  253.5  1.4  316.2  3.3
2.  (FTC)  Industry
Coetruction  tlun  O. D  0.  9.  l  C.6  241.5  2.7  602.7  4.6  645.9  4.9  484.6  2.5  263.5  1.4  316.2  I.1
3. I.3.3.  31  OD
(UK  tea.)  3.  . 1..  62.3  - 1!3.4  7e.6  7,935.5  69.0  9.087.7  71.9  11,321.1  65.6  13.936.0  72.6  16.255.6  69.5  23,194.6  92.0  Vl
tl.  C.it.l  Imome  L  3.1  O..)  (.0  234.9  2.6  1.567.1  12.6  2.926.1  37.0  2.474.5  12.9  60.0  0.2  1.666.6  6.6
A.  llsac  Surplus
3.wm  e4I  4.!  3.1  0.0  Oi.ui  234.9  2.6  1.567.1  12.6  2,920.9  16.9  2,469.4  12.9  20.9  0.1  I1,6.6  6.6
A.  Other  Capital
evenues  5  (  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  7.2  0.0  5.1  0.0  19.1  0.1  0.0  0.0
Tota  leveue  .;  100.0  ., 636.5  (0.0  8.914.4  100.0  12,643.9  100.0  17.247.6  100.0  .9137.2  300.0  20.393.9  100.0  26.302.1  100.6
I S6lUCurret  Incme  .0  65.0  0.0  76.6  0.0  91.4  0.0  82.2  0.0  79.1  0.0  63.6  0.0  69.7  0.0  67.?
1.  Actual  *Vigr.e
2.  Covernmet  special  prwogramm  ;1  P3..  IPC.  (Inral  4eve.opo_nt,  foods  programs.  Commuity  programs)
J.  It  locluds  Le  55165 r*sl1oea:,r  s*tevue.
4.  Th. 1960 surplus for $375.6  nil  . is  not licl.,ded  in  1661.
5. rized  &._te  sales  proceedm &nS  v,;,w  Funds surplases (Eployee  Funds).
Sources  Costralorla  Genierl do  I  1 . utlica  Infors..  Fin.n,  lroa.rbl.-  A14  Instituto  Colooblno  do  Slteastar Familiar 11CSF)v  Total  Ezpeaditures.  1900-S7
(tlillions  of  Colombian S5
Deacription  (2)  l98I  ( 1  1982  (2)  1963  (1)  1964  (2)  19S5  CZ)  196S  tP)  191  (it)
Operat  loal
Perrmal  Services  2  5.0  176.7  5.7  529.6  7.1  190.0  2.1  327.9  2.9  376.0  2.7  840.8  2.1  536.5  2.1
GCniral  xpenes  1  - 2.9  19.0  2.7  229.2  3.1  87.1  1.0  112.6  1.0  166.6  1.2  233.4  1.1  243.6  1.0
Traf-era  1.8  10.8  1.6  152.6  2.0  629.7  9.1  2,739.9  24.2  3.027.6  21.6  3,639.0  1.3  4,77f.1  19.0
Total General 9xpendituree  51  h  9.8  06J.3  10.0  911.4  12.2  1,106.8  12.1  3,IOS.4  2S.0  3,570.2  25.5  4,513.2  21.5  5.556.2  22.1
lnI  etmnt  Sen.IWures
Children  £aecstasne,  Programs  3.61  I;  87.6  4.  4  72.5  4.995.6  66.9  5.992.3  65.5  U.S.  0.0  10,123.0  72.2  13,593.6  64.6  16,071.0  71.0
Adults  hAaIstane  Program  79  1  1  14.3  .21.7  12.4  1,160.1  15.8  1,493.0  16.3  n.e.  0.0  0.0  1,460.0  7.0  221.0  0.9
Pbysical Infrastructure  -
Healtb  SlI  1.6  ;  1..  3.2  65.3  1.1  114.7  1.3  n.S.  0.0  d  9.2  0.6  1.273.7  6.1  1,198.0  4.S
Mhuss  Resources Training
and  Researeb  0.0  0.0  ;7.  2  t  . 15.6  0.2  31.6  0.3  n.e.  0.0  222.9  1.6  138.7  0.6  104.5  0.4
Global  Planing.  Social 
Devlopmant  4.3  0.1  4.  O  0.0  0.1  0.0  n.a.  0.0  0.0  11.6  0.1  10.0  0.0
food  an  Rural  Developmant
Program  343.0  8.4  t.0  263.9  3.S  403.0  4.4  a.S.  0.0  17.0  0.1  0.0  7.3  0.0
Total  Inest_st
lupeaitures  4,871.2  90.4  S.  V8  8  90.0  8,580.7  67.6  5,034.9  67.9  6C15S6.9 1  72.0  10,452.1  74.5  16,457.6  76.5  19.610.1  77.9
Total  Gasto.  5,369.6  I0C.0  6.411.9  IN0.u0  7,472.1  100.0  9,143.7  100.0  11 .39.3  100.0  14,022.3  100.0  20,970.6  100.0  25,166.3  100.0
1.  Budget  estimates.  Actual  data  rit  found.
Sources  Contraloria  Goniral  de  Is  -9.blica.  lntor,-s  Fiancl  sros.Table  r15  Ins:ituto  Colodbiano  de  BieneStar  Ftitier  (ICOF):  Totol  RevemeS. 190D-87
(Millions  o  Co  cb) n  )
Description  1980  f . 198  ({  1982  (M)  1983  (X)  1984  (1'  M  CX)  1986  1S)  1987  (1)
1.  Current  Revewsws  4,740.4  57.5  5,83'.9  7.  6,763.4  83.8  8,737.6  89.0  11,164.0  89.3  14,210.6  89.7  18,524.0  82.5  24,095.1  87.4
A.  Operationml  35.2  0.  a.  7.7  1.l  32.6  0.4  39.0  0.4  31.7  0.3  186.2  1.2  380.9  1.7  111.3  0.4
D.  Budget  Trwa.fers,
Texes  4,7M0.2  57.1  5,76'.2  '5.5,  5,730.8  83.4  8,698.6  88.6  11,132.3  89.0  14,024.4  88.5  18,143.1  80.8  23,963.8  87.0
1.  Transfers  1,121.2  13.6  891.2  11.  266.5  3.3  167.9  1.7  344.8  2.8  17.0  0.1  28.5  0.1  160.0  0.6
2.  R.0.E.  3,584.0  43.5  4,87.'.0  O.Ai  6,464.3  80.1  8,530.7  86.9  10,787.5  86.3  14,007.4  88.4  18,114.6  80.7  23,823.8  86.4  1
00
11.  CapitaL  Incom.  3,500.1  42.5  1,791.8  23.t.  1,305.2  16.2  1,076.1  11.0  1,341.3  10.7  1,638.6  10.3  3,918.6  17.5  3,484.3  12.6  -4
Total  Revenues  8,240.5  00.0  r,63'.7  100.(1  8,068.6 100.0  9,815.7 100.0  12,505.3  100.0  15,849.2  100.0  22,442.6  100.0  27,579.4  100.0 I
X R.D.E./Current  Incom  75.6  81.5  95.6  97.6  96.6  98.6  97.8  98.9
Sjuc  :  Contralorla  Generat  de  La '!Vublica.  Inf,m,s  Financieros.- 88  -
Table  A16  Calas  de  Compensacion  Familiar:  Revenues  and Exwenditures.  1980-87
Revenues  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987
Revenues
Total  ..  ..  47,680  61,445  75,586  ..  171,770
Taxes  6,979  9,348  12,457  17,048  21,866  29,080  na.  51,258  I/
Coamercial  Operation  n.a.  n.a.  35,223  44,397  53,720  n.a.  93,073  2/  120,512  2/
ExDenditures
Total  6,979  9,348  12,457  17,048  21,866  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
Subsidy  in  Cash  3,278  4,664  6,204  8,828  11,196
Subsidy  in  Kind  n.a.  ..  152  246  358  n.a.  n.e.  n.e.
Subsidy  in  Services  n.a.  1,702  2,439  3,270  4,021  n.a.  n.e.  n.a.
Other  3/  n.e.  2,981  3,662  4,704  6,290  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
Notes:
1. Sixty-nine  Family  Funds.
2.  Forty-Five  Funds.
3.  Administrative  expenses.
Source: Hanrique  and  Associates,  Years  1980-84.
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